This paper examines how non-binding co-operative agreements on marine fisheries management can be sustained when management plans in participating countries are implemented with error. The effects of implementation uncertainty on voluntary co-operation are compared to those of recruitment uncertainty. A self-enforcing co-operative solution can only be sustained when uncertainty is not too pronounced. Even when a co-operative agreement can be achieved, frequent phases of reversion to non-co-operative harvest levels are needed to support the agreement. The implications of recruitment uncertainty for implicit co-operation are less detrimental than those of implementation uncertainty.
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Paper provided by Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei in its series Working Papers with number
2003.118.
Find related papers by JEL classification: Q22 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Renewable Resources and Conservation - - - Fishery C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Sethi, Gautam & Costello, Christopher & Fisher, Anthony C. & Hanemann, William Michael & Karp, Larry S., 2002.
"Fishery management under multiple uncertainty,"
CUDARE Working Paper Series
929, University of California at Berkeley, Department of Agricultural and Resource Economics and Policy.
Other versions:
Spence, A Michael & Starrett, David, 1975.
"Most Rapid Approach Paths in Accumulation Problems,"
International Economic Review,
Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 16(2), pages 388-403, June.
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