Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

International partnerships, foreign control and income levels : theory and evidence

Contents:

Author Info

  • Christa N. Brunnschweiler

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

  • Simone Valente

    (Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology)

Abstract

We analyze the effects of different regimes of control rights over critical resources on the total domestic income of open economies. Considering home control, foreign control, and international partnerships in a theoretical model with incomplete contracts and more productive foreign technologies, we show that (i) partnerships can be jointly optimal, (ii) foreign control is never optimal, (iii) assigning complete residual rights to foreign firms reduces domestic income via a Dutch-Disease mechanism. Empirical evidence using a new dataset on petroleum ownership structures for up to 68 countries between 1867-2008 shows that (i) international partnerships tend to generate higher domestic income than foreign control, and (ii) partnership and foreign control are linked to high or intermediate relative profitability of the domestic resource endowment, whereas home control is associated with low relative profitability.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/WP/2012/11_intpartnerships_CB_SV.pdf
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Department of Economics, Norwegian University of Science and Technology in its series Working Paper Series with number 13412.

as in new window
Length: 44 pages
Date of creation: 17 Aug 2012
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:nst:samfok:13412

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 7491 Trondheim
Phone: 73 59 19 40
Fax: 73 59 69 54
Email:
Web page: http://www.svt.ntnu.no/iso/WP/wp.htm
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Daron Acemoglu & Simon Johnson, 2003. "Unbundling Institutions," NBER Working Papers 9934, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Oliver Hart & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1996. "The Proper Scope of Government: Theory and an Application to Prisons," NBER Working Papers 5744, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Rajan, Raghuram G & Zingales, Luigi, 1998. "Power in a Theory of the Firm," CEPR Discussion Papers 1777, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Andrew Mold & Sebastian Paulo & Annalisa Prizon, 2009. "Taking Stock of the Credit Crunch: Implications for Development Finance and Global Governance," OECD Development Centre Working Papers 277, OECD Publishing.
  5. Oliver Hart & Sanford Grossman, 1985. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Working papers 372, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  6. Timothy Besley & Maitreesh Ghatak, 2001. "Government Versus Private Ownership Of Public Goods," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 116(4), pages 1343-1372, November.
  7. Halvor Mehlum & Karl Moene & Ragnar Torvik, 2002. "Institutions and the resource curse," GE, Growth, Math methods 0210004, EconWPA.
  8. Jodice, David A., 1980. "Sources of change in Third World regimes for foreign direct investment, 1968–1976," International Organization, Cambridge University Press, vol. 34(02), pages 177-206, March.
  9. Frederick Van der Ploeg & Anthony J. Venables, 2009. "Harnessing Windfall Revenues: Optimal Policies for Resource-Rich Developing Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 2571, CESifo Group Munich.
  10. Guriev, Sergei & Kolotilin, Anton & Sonin, Konstantin, 2008. "Determinants of Expropriation in the Oil Sector: A Theory and Evidence from Panel Data," CEPR Discussion Papers 6755, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  11. Andrew Gelman, 2009. "A statistician’s perspective on “Mostly Harmless Econometrics: An Empiricist's Companion”, by Joshua D. Angrist and Jorn-Steffen Pischke," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 9(2), pages 315-320, June.
  12. Oliver Hart & John Moore, 1988. "Property Rights and the Nature of the Firm," Working papers 495, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Department of Economics.
  13. Pol Antr�s, 2005. "Property Rights and the International Organization of Production," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 25-32, May.
  14. Daniel Hoechle, 2007. "Robust standard errors for panel regressions with cross-sectional dependence," Stata Journal, StataCorp LP, vol. 7(3), pages 281-312, September.
  15. Barro, Robert J. & Lee, Jong Wha, 2013. "A new data set of educational attainment in the world, 1950–2010," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 104(C), pages 184-198.
  16. Wolf, Christian, 2009. "Does ownership matter? The performance and efficiency of State Oil vs. Private Oil (1987-2006)," Energy Policy, Elsevier, vol. 37(7), pages 2642-2652, July.
  17. Frederick Van der Ploeg, 2010. "Natural Resources: Curse or Blessing?," CESifo Working Paper Series 3125, CESifo Group Munich.
  18. John C. Driscoll & Aart C. Kraay, 1998. "Consistent Covariance Matrix Estimation With Spatially Dependent Panel Data," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 80(4), pages 549-560, November.
  19. Megginson, William L., 2005. "The economics of bank privatization," Journal of Banking & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 29(8-9), pages 1931-1980, August.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nst:samfok:13412. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Marit Balstad Jensen) The email address of this maintainer does not seem to be valid anymore. Please ask Marit Balstad Jensen to update the entry or send us the correct address.

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.