Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules
AbstractWe investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of fuzzy individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social preference. We show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy a minimal range condition are dictatorial. In other words, there is an individual whose fuzzy preferences determine the entire fuzzy social ranking at every profile in the domain of the aggregation rule. To prove this theorem, we show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy the minimal range condition must also satisfy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto criterion. There has been hardly any treatment of the manipulability problem in the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National University of Ireland Galway, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0098.
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision: 2005
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Fuzzy aggregation rules; Strategy-proofness;
Other versions of this item:
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
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