Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Strategy-proof fuzzy aggregation rules

Contents:

Author Info

  • Juan Perote Pena
  • Ashley Piggins

    (Department of Economics, National University of Ireland, Galway)

Abstract

We investigate the structure of fuzzy aggregation rules which, for every permissible profile of fuzzy individual preferences, specify a fuzzy social preference. We show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy a minimal range condition are dictatorial. In other words, there is an individual whose fuzzy preferences determine the entire fuzzy social ranking at every profile in the domain of the aggregation rule. To prove this theorem, we show that all fuzzy aggregation rules which are strategyproof and satisfy the minimal range condition must also satisfy counterparts of independence of irrelevant alternatives and the Pareto criterion. There has been hardly any treatment of the manipulability problem in the literature on social choice with fuzzy preferences.

Download Info

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=105
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=105 [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.nuigalway.ie/business-public-policy-law/cairnes/subjectareas/economics/resrch/paper.php?pid=105). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Srinivas Raghavendra)
File Function: First version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

File URL: http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=105
Our checks indicate that this address may not be valid because: 404 Not Found (http://www.economics.nuig.ie/resrch/paper.php?pid=105 [301 Moved Permanently]--> http://www.nuigalway.ie/business-public-policy-law/cairnes/subjectareas/economics/resrch/paper.php?pid=105). If this is indeed the case, please notify (Srinivas Raghavendra)
File Function: Revised version, 2005
Download Restriction: no

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National University of Ireland Galway, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number 0098.

as in new window
Length:
Date of creation: 2005
Date of revision: 2005
Handle: RePEc:nig:wpaper:0098

Contact details of provider:
Postal: St. Anthony's College, Newcastle Road, Galway
Phone: +353-91 524411 ext. 2501
Fax: +353-91 524130
Web page: http://economics.nuigalway.ie
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords: Fuzzy aggregation rules; Strategy-proofness;

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. D'ASPREMONT, Claude & GEVERS, Louis, . "Social welfare functionals and interpersonal comparability," CORE Discussion Papers RP -1564, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
  2. Dutta, Bhaskar & Panda, Santosh C. & Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1986. "Exact choice and fuzzy preferences," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 11(1), pages 53-68, February.
  3. Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-17, June.
  4. Leclerc, B., 1984. "Efficient and binary consensus functions on transitively valued relations," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 8(1), pages 45-61, August.
  5. Sen, Amartya, 1970. "Interpersonal Aggregation and Partial Comparability," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 38(3), pages 393-409, May.
  6. Gregory Richardson, 1998. "The structure of fuzzy preferences: Social choice implications," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 359-369.
  7. Dutta, Bhaskan, 1987. "Fuzzy preferences and social choice," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 13(3), pages 215-229, June.
  8. Basu, Kaushik, 1984. "Fuzzy revealed preference theory," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 32(2), pages 212-227, April.
  9. H. Moulin, 1980. "On strategy-proofness and single peakedness," Public Choice, Springer, vol. 35(4), pages 437-455, January.
  10. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
  11. Tang, Fang-Fang, 1994. "Fuzzy Preferences and Social Choice," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 46(3), pages 263-69, July.
  12. Garcia-Lapresta, Jose Luis & Llamazares, Bonifacio, 2001. "Majority decisions based on difference of votes," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 35(3), pages 463-481, June.
  13. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1973. "On the stability of sincere voting situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 558-574, December.
  14. Rajat Deb & Manabendra Dasgupta, 1996. "Transitivity and fuzzy preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 13(3), pages 305-318.
  15. Barrett, C Richard & Pattanaik, Prasanta K, 1989. "Fuzzy Sets, Preference and Choice: Some Conceptual Issues," Bulletin of Economic Research, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 41(4), pages 229-53, October.
  16. Blackorby, Charles, 1975. "Degrees of Cardinality and Aggregate Partial Orderings," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 43(5-6), pages 845-52, Sept.-Nov.
  17. Salvador Barberà, 2001. "An introduction to strategy-proof social choice functions," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 18(4), pages 619-653.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Salvador Barberà, 2010. "Strategy-proof social choice," Working Papers 420, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
  2. Dietrich, Franz & List, Christian, 2013. "Probabilistic opinion pooling generalized Part one: General agendas," MPRA Paper 57253, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised Jul 2014.
  3. Conal Duddy & Juan Perote-Peña & Ashley Piggins, 2011. "Arrow’s theorem and max-star transitivity," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 36(1), pages 25-34, January.
  4. Conal Duddy & Juan Perote-Peña & Ashley Piggins, 2010. "Manipulating an aggregation rule under ordinally fuzzy preferences," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 34(3), pages 411-428, March.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:nig:wpaper:0098. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Srinivas Raghavendra).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.