Organ Transplants, Hiring Committees, and Early Rounds of the Kappell Piano Competition
AbstractFunction g selects exactly k alternatives as a function of the preferences of n individuals. It cannot be manipulated by any individual, assuming that an individual prefers set A to B whenever A can be obtained from B by eliminating some alternatives and replacing each with a preferred alternative. Then there is someone whose k top-ranked alternatives are always selected if: (i). k = 2 and n $ 2; or (ii). k = 3 and n = 2; or (iii). k > 3, n = 2, and g has a unanimity property; or (iv). k > 2, n $ 2, g has a unanimity property, and no coalition can manipulate.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 51.
Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 30 Apr 2007
Date of revision:
coalitions; dictatorship; manipulation; multi-valued social choice function;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-05-04 (All new papers)
- NEP-CDM-2007-05-04 (Collective Decision-Making)
- NEP-MIC-2007-05-04 (Microeconomics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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