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Organ Transplants, Hiring Committees, and Early Rounds of the Kappell Piano Competition

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Author Info
Donald E. Campbell () (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)
Jerry S. Kelly () (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)
Abstract

Function g selects exactly k alternatives as a function of the preferences of n individuals. It cannot be manipulated by any individual, assuming that an individual prefers set A to B whenever A can be obtained from B by eliminating some alternatives and replacing each with a preferred alternative. Then there is someone whose k top-ranked alternatives are always selected if: (i). k = 2 and n $ 2; or (ii). k = 3 and n = 2; or (iii). k > 3, n = 2, and g has a unanimity property; or (iv). k > 2, n $ 2, g has a unanimity property, and no coalition can manipulate.

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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 51.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 30 Apr 2007
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:51

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Related research
Keywords: coalitions; dictatorship; manipulation; multi-valued social choice function;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
D71 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Social Choice; Clubs; Committees; Associations

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  2. Gardenfors, Peter, 1976. "Manipulation of social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 217-228, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1973. "On the stability of sincere voting situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 558-574, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  5. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-17, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  7. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  8. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1974. "Stability of sincere voting under some classes of non-binary group decision procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 206-224, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "A trade-off result for preference revelation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-141, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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