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Organ Transplants, Hiring Committees, and Early Rounds of the Kappell Piano Competition

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Author Info

  • Donald E. Campbell

    ()
    (Department of Economics, College of William and Mary)

  • Jerry S. Kelly

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Syracuse University)

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    Abstract

    Function g selects exactly k alternatives as a function of the preferences of n individuals. It cannot be manipulated by any individual, assuming that an individual prefers set A to B whenever A can be obtained from B by eliminating some alternatives and replacing each with a preferred alternative. Then there is someone whose k top-ranked alternatives are always selected if: (i). k = 2 and n $ 2; or (ii). k = 3 and n = 2; or (iii). k > 3, n = 2, and g has a unanimity property; or (iv). k > 2, n $ 2, g has a unanimity property, and no coalition can manipulate.

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    File URL: http://economics.wm.edu/wp/cwm_wp51.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Economics, College of William and Mary in its series Working Papers with number 51.

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    Length: 26 pages
    Date of creation: 30 Apr 2007
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:cwm:wpaper:51

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    Related research

    Keywords: coalitions; dictatorship; manipulation; multi-valued social choice function;

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    1. Gibbard, Allan, 1973. "Manipulation of Voting Schemes: A General Result," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 41(4), pages 587-601, July.
    2. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1973. "On the stability of sincere voting situations," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 6(6), pages 558-574, December.
    3. Gardenfors, Peter, 1976. "Manipulation of social choice functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 13(2), pages 217-228, October.
    4. Campbell, Donald E. & Kelly, Jerry S., 2000. "A trade-off result for preference revelation," Journal of Mathematical Economics, Elsevier, vol. 34(1), pages 129-141, August.
    5. Pattanaik, Prasanta K., 1974. "Stability of sincere voting under some classes of non-binary group decision procedures," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 8(2), pages 206-224, June.
    6. Barbera, Salvador & Dutta, Bhaskar & Sen, Arunava, 2001. "Strategy-proof Social Choice Correspondences," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 101(2), pages 374-394, December.
    7. Satterthwaite, Mark Allen, 1975. "Strategy-proofness and Arrow's conditions: Existence and correspondence theorems for voting procedures and social welfare functions," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 10(2), pages 187-217, April.
    8. Barbera, Salvador, 1983. "Strategy-Proofness and Pivotal Voters: A Direct Proof of the Gibbard-Satterthwaite Theorem," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 24(2), pages 413-17, June.
    9. Lin Zhou & Stephen Ching, 2002. "Multi-valued strategy-proof social choice rules," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer, vol. 19(3), pages 569-580.
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