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Bundling Among Rivals: A Case of Pharmaceutical Cocktails

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  • Claudio Lucarelli
  • Sean Nicholson
  • Minjae Song

Abstract

We empirically analyze the welfare effects of cross-firm bundling in the pharmaceutical industry. Physicians often treat patients with "cocktail" regimens that combine two or more drugs. Firms cannot price discriminate because each drug is produced by a different firm and a physician creates the bundle in her office from the component drugs. We show that a less competitive equilibrium arises with cocktail products because firms can internalize partially the externality their pricing decisions impose on competitors. The incremental profits from creating a bundle are sometimes as large as the incremental profits from a merger of the same two firms.

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  • Claudio Lucarelli & Sean Nicholson & Minjae Song, 2010. "Bundling Among Rivals: A Case of Pharmaceutical Cocktails," NBER Working Papers 16321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    • Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:16321
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    Cited by:

    1. Armstrong, Mark, 2010. "Bundling revisited: substitute products and inter-firm discounts," MPRA Paper 26782, University Library of Munich, Germany.
    2. Mark Armstrong, 2016. "Nonlinear Pricing," Annual Review of Economics, Annual Reviews, vol. 8(1), pages 583-614, October.
    3. Armstrong, Mark, 2013. "A more general theory of commodity bundling," Journal of Economic Theory, Elsevier, vol. 148(2), pages 448-472.

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    More about this item

    JEL classification:

    • I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
    • L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
    • L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms

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