Do Exclusivity Arrangments Harm Consumers?
AbstractThis paper explores welfare implications of exclusivity arrangements, e.g. iPhone?s part- nership with wireless carriers. Two ?rms compete in a primary good market, while a monop- olistic ?rm o¤ers a value-adding good. The primary good can be consumed alone, while the value-adding good must be consumed with the primary good. The monopolistic ?rm forms an exclusivity partnership with one of the primary good providers. Buyers are able to consume the value-adding good only if they patronize the monopolistic ?rm?s exclusive partner. This practice allows the monopolistic ?rm to extract surplus from the primary good market. Sur- prisingly, consumers bene?t from the exclusivity arrangement. However, overall social welfare declines, despite improvements to consumer welfare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Illinois State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series with number 20111001.
Length: 28 pages
Date of creation: Oct 2011
Date of revision:
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Web page: http://economics.illinoisstate.edu
exclusivity; consumer welfare; market efficiency; hotelling;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- L1 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
- L4 - Industrial Organization - - Antitrust Issues and Policies
- L5 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-11-01 (All new papers)
- NEP-COM-2011-11-01 (Industrial Competition)
- NEP-IND-2011-11-01 (Industrial Organization)
- NEP-MKT-2011-11-01 (Marketing)
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