Insurers’ Negotiating Leverage and the External Effects of Medicare Part D
AbstractBy influencing the size and bargaining power of private insurers, public subsidization of private health insurance may project effects beyond the subsidized population. We test for such spillovers in Medicare Part D by analyzing how resulting increases in insurer size affected drug prices negotiated in the non-Medicare commercial market. On average, Part D lowered prices for commercial enrollees by 5.3%. The external commercial market savings amount to $2.6 billion per year, which, if passed to consumers, approximates the cost-savings of newly-insured subsidized beneficiaries. If retained by insurers, it corresponds to an 8% average increase in profitability.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2011-065.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Other versions of this item:
- Darius N. Lakdawalla & Wesley Yin, 2010. "Insurers' Negotiating Leverage and the External Effects of Medicare Part D," NBER Working Papers 16251, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- H57 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Procurement
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
- L11 - Industrial Organization - - Market Structure, Firm Strategy, and Market Performance - - - Production, Pricing, and Market Structure; Size Distribution of Firms
- L51 - Industrial Organization - - Regulation and Industrial Policy - - - Economics of Regulation
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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