Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login to save this paper or follow this series

Insurers’ Negotiating Leverage and the External Effects of Medicare Part D

Contents:

Author Info

  • Wesley Yin

    ()
    (Department of Economics, Boston University and NBER)

  • Darius Lakdawalla

    ()
    (University of Southern California and NBER)

Abstract

By influencing the size and bargaining power of private insurers, public subsidization of private health insurance may project effects beyond the subsidized population. We test for such spillovers in Medicare Part D by analyzing how resulting increases in insurer size affected drug prices negotiated in the non-Medicare commercial market. On average, Part D lowered prices for commercial enrollees by 5.3%. The external commercial market savings amount to $2.6 billion per year, which, if passed to consumers, approximates the cost-savings of newly-insured subsidized beneficiaries. If retained by insurers, it corresponds to an 8% average increase in profitability.

Download Info

To our knowledge, this item is not available for download. To find whether it is available, there are three options:
1. Check below under "Related research" whether another version of this item is available online.
2. Check on the provider's web page whether it is in fact available.
3. Perform a search for a similarly titled item that would be available.

Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Boston University - Department of Economics in its series Boston University - Department of Economics - Working Papers Series with number WP2011-065.

as in new window
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: Jan 2011
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-065

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 270 Bay State Road, Boston, MA 02215
Phone: 617-353-4389
Fax: 617-353-444
Web page: http://www.bu.edu/econ/
More information through EDIRC

Related research

Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

Find related papers by JEL classification:

References

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
as in new window
  1. Brooks, John M. & Dor, Avi & Wong, Herbert S., 1997. "Hospital-insurer bargaining: An empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(4), pages 417-434, August.
  2. Tasneem Chipty & Christopher M. Snyder, 1999. "The Role Of Firm Size In Bilateral Bargaining: A Study Of The Cable Television Industry," The Review of Economics and Statistics, MIT Press, vol. 81(2), pages 326-340, May.
  3. Town, Robert & Vistnes, Gregory, 2001. "Hospital competition in HMO networks," Journal of Health Economics, Elsevier, vol. 20(5), pages 733-753, September.
  4. Jonathan D. Ketcham & Kosali Simon, 2008. "Medicare Part D's Effects on Elderly Drug Costs and Utilization," NBER Working Papers 14326, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  5. Claudio Lucarelli & Jeffrey Prince & Kosali Simon, 2008. "The Welfare Impact of Reducing Choice in Medicare Part D: A Comparison of Two Regulation Strategies," NBER Working Papers 14296, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  6. Gary V. Engelhardt & Jonathan Gruber, 2010. "Medicare Part D and the Financial Protection of the Elderly," NBER Working Papers 16155, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

Citations

Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
as in new window

Cited by:
  1. Eric Helland & Darius N. Lakdawalla & Anup Malani & Seth A. Seabury, 2014. "Unintended Consequences of Products Liability: Evidence from the Pharmaceutical Market," NBER Working Papers 20005, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Claudio Lucarelli & Sean Nicholson & Minjae Song, 2010. "Bundling Among Rivals: A Case of Pharmaceutical Cocktails," NBER Working Papers 16321, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.

Lists

This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

Statistics

Access and download statistics

Corrections

When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bos:wpaper:wp2011-065. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Gillian Gurish).

If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.