Regulation of private health insurance markets: Lessons from enrollment, plan type choice, and adverse selection in Medicare Part D
AbstractWe study the Medicare Part D prescription drug insurance program as a bellwether for designs of private, non-mandatory health insurance markets that control adverse selection and assure adequate access and coverage. We model Part D enrollment and plan choice assuming a discrete dynamic decision process that maximizes life-cycle expected utility, and perform counterfactual policy simulations of the effect of market design on participation and plan viability. Our model correctly predicts high Part D enrollment rates among the currently healthy, but also strong adverse selection in choice of level of coverage. We analyze alternative designs that preserve plan variety.
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 15392.
Date of creation: Oct 2009
Date of revision:
Note: AG HE
Contact details of provider:
Postal: National Bureau of Economic Research, 1050 Massachusetts Avenue Cambridge, MA 02138, U.S.A.
Web page: http://www.nber.org
More information through EDIRC
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C25 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Single Equation Models; Single Variables - - - Discrete Regression and Qualitative Choice Models; Discrete Regressors; Proportions
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- H51 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Health
- I11 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Analysis of Health Care Markets
- I18 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Government Policy; Regulation; Public Health
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2009-10-10 (All new papers)
- NEP-CTA-2009-10-10 (Contract Theory & Applications)
- NEP-IAS-2009-10-10 (Insurance Economics)
- NEP-REG-2009-10-10 (Regulation)
You can help add them by filling out this form.
CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012.
"Remedies for Sick Insurance,"
620, Barcelona Graduate School of Economics.
- Daniel L. McFadden & Carlos E. Noton & Pau Olivella, 2012. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," NBER Working Papers 17938, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Daniel McFadden & Carlos Noton & Pau Olivella, 2013. "Remedies for Sick Insurance," Documentos de Trabajo 302, Centro de Economía Aplicada, Universidad de Chile.
- Heiss, Florian & Leive, Adam & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2012.
"Plan selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from administrative data,"
Annual Conference 2012 (Goettingen): New Approaches and Challenges for the Labor Market of the 21st Century
65406, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Heiss, Florian & Leive, Adam & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from administrative Data," Discussion Paper Series of SFB/TR 15 Governance and the Efficiency of Economic Systems 384, Free University of Berlin, Humboldt University of Berlin, University of Bonn, University of Mannheim, University of Munich.
- Florian Heiss & Adam Leive & Daniel McFadden & Joachim Winter, 2012. "Plan Selection in Medicare Part D: Evidence from Administrative Data," NBER Working Papers 18166, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Schmitz, Hendrik & Ziebarth, Nicolas R., 2011.
"In Absolute or Relative Terms? How Framing Prices Affects the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice,"
IZA Discussion Papers
6241, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
- Hendrik Schmitz & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2011. "In Absolute or Relative Terms?: How Framing Prices Affects the Consumer Price Sensitivity of Health Plan Choice," SOEPpapers on Multidisciplinary Panel Data Research 423, DIW Berlin, The German Socio-Economic Panel (SOEP).
- Ziebarth, N.; & Schmitz, H.;, 2012. "In absolute or relative terms? How framing prices affects the consumer price sensitivity of health plan choice," Health, Econometrics and Data Group (HEDG) Working Papers 12/03, HEDG, c/o Department of Economics, University of York.
- Kesternich, Iris & Heiss, Florian & McFadden, Daniel & Winter, Joachim, 2012. "Suit the action to the word, the word to the action: Hypothetical choices and real decisions in Medicare Part D," Discussion Papers in Economics 14124, University of Munich, Department of Economics.
- Hendrik Schmitz & Nicolas R. Ziebarth, 2011. "In Absolute or Relative Terms? How Framing Prices Affects the Consumer Price Sensitivity of," Ruhr Economic Papers 0304, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: ().
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.