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Private Information and its Effect on Market Equilibrium: New Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance

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Author Info
Amy Finkelstein
Kathleen McGarry
Abstract

This paper examines the standard test for asymmetric information in insurance markets: that its presence will result in a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence. We show empirically that while there is no evidence of this positive correlation in the long-term care insurance market, asymmetric information still exists. We use individuals' subjective assessments of the chance they will enter a nursing home, together with the insurance companies' own assessment, to show that individuals do have private information about their risk type. Moreover, this private information is positively correlated with insurance coverage. We reconcile this direct evidence of asymmetric information with the lack of a positive correlation between insurance coverage and risk occurrence by demonstrating the existence of other unobserved characteristics that are positively related to coverage and negatively related to risk occurrence. Specifically, we find that more cautious individuals are both more likely to have long-term care insurance and less likely to enter a nursing home. Our results demonstrate that insurance markets may suffer from asymmetric information, and its negative efficiency consequences, even if those with more insurance are not higher risk. The results also suggest an alternative approach to testing for asymmetric information in insurance markets.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 9957.

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Date of creation: Sep 2003
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:9957

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Find related papers by JEL classification:
D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information
G22 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Insurance; Insurance Companies

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References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. de Meza, David & Webb, David C, 2001. "Advantageous Selection in Insurance Markets," RAND Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 32(2), pages 249-62, Summer.
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  2. David M. Cutler, 2002. "Health Care and the Public Sector," NBER Working Papers 8802, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  3. Norton, Edward C., 2000. "Long-term care," Handbook of Health Economics, in: A. J. Culyer & J. P. Newhouse (ed.), Handbook of Health Economics, edition 1, volume 1, chapter 17, pages 955-994 Elsevier. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  6. John Cawley & Tomas Philipson, 1999. "An Empirical Examination of Information Barriers to Trade in Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 89(4), pages 827-846, September. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  7. Li Gan & Michael Hurd & Daniel McFadden, 2003. "Individual Subjective Survival Curves," NBER Working Papers 9480, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  8. Jullien, Bruno & Salanié, Bernard & Salanié, François, 2001. "Screening Risk-Averse Agents Under Moral Hazard," IDEI Working Papers 131, Institut d'Économie Industrielle (IDEI), Toulouse. [Downloadable!]
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  9. Michael D. Hurd & Kathleen McGarry, 2002. "The Predictive Validity of Subjective Probabilities of Survival," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 112(482), pages 966-985, October. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  10. Pierre-André Chiappori ; Bruno Jullien ; Bernard Salanié ; François Salanié, 2002. "Asymmetric Information in Insurance : General Testable Implications," Working Papers 2002-42, Centre de Recherche en Economie et Statistique. [Downloadable!]
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  14. Sloan, Frank A & Norton, Edward C, 1997. "Adverse Selection, Bequests, Crowding Out, and Private Demand for Insurance: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 15(3), pages 201-19, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  15. Daniel S. Hamermesh, 1985. "Expectations, Life Expectancy, and Economic Behavior," NBER Working Papers 0835, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. DE DONDER, Philippe & HINDRIKS, Jean, 2006. "Does propitious selection explain why riskier people buy less insurance?," CORE Discussion Papers 2006032, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE). [Downloadable!]
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  2. M. Kate Bundorf & Bradley Herring & Mark Pauly, 2005. "Health Risk, Income, and Employment-Based Health Insurance," NBER Working Papers 11677, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  3. Dean Karlan & Jonathan Zinman, 2005. "Observing unobservables: identifying information asymmetries with a consumer-credit field experiment," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago, issue Apr. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  4. Hanming Fang & Michael P. Keane & Dan Silverman, 2006. "Sources of Advantageous Selection: Evidence from the Medigap Insurance Market," NBER Working Papers 12289, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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  5. Olivia S. Mitchell & John Piggott & Satoshi Shimizutani, 2004. "Aged-Care Support in Japan: Perspectives and Challenges," NBER Working Papers 10882, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  6. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry, 2006. "Multiple Dimensions of Private Information: Evidence from the Long-Term Care Insurance Market," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 96(4), pages 938-958, September. [Downloadable!]
  7. Denise Doiron & Glenn Jones & Elizabeth Savage, 2006. "Healthy, wealthy and insured? The role of self-assessed health in the demand for private health insurance, CHERE Working Paper 2006/2," Working Papers 2006/2, CHERE, University of Technology, Sydney. [Downloadable!]
  8. Jeffrey R. Brown & Amy Finkelstein, 2004. "Supply or Demand: Why is the Market for Long-Term Care Insurance So Small?," NBER Working Papers 10782, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Kathleen McGarry & Robert F. Schoeni, 2003. "Medicare Gaps and Widow Poverty," Working Papers wp065, University of Michigan, Michigan Retirement Research Center. [Downloadable!]
  10. Philippe Donder & Jean Hindriks, 2009. "Adverse selection, moral hazard and propitious selection," Journal of Risk and Uncertainty, Springer, vol. 38(1), pages 73-86, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  11. Stanciole, Anderson, 2007. "Health Insurance and Life Style Choices: Identifying the Ex Ante Moral Hazard," IRISS Working Paper Series 2007-10, IRISS at CEPS/INSTEAD. [Downloadable!]
  12. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry & Amir Sufi, 2005. "Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from long-term care insurance," NBER Working Papers 11039, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  13. Denise Doiron & Glenn Jones & Elizabeth Savage, 2008. "Healthy, wealthy and insured? The role of self-assessed health in the demand for private health insurance," Health Economics, John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 17(3), pages 317-334. [Downloadable!]
  14. Amy Finkelstein & Kathleen McGarry & Amir Sufi, 2005. "Dynamic Inefficiencies in Insurance Markets: Evidence from Long-Term Care Insurance," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 95(2), pages 224-228, May. [Downloadable!]
  15. David C. Grabowski & Jonathan Gruber, 2005. "Moral Hazard in Nursing Home Use," NBER Working Papers 11723, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  16. Olivia S. Mitchell & John Piggott & Michael Sherris & Shaun Yow, 2006. "Financial Innovation for an Aging World," NBER Working Papers 12444, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
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