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Private health insurance and the use of health care services - a review of the theoretical literature with application to voluntary private health insurance in universal health care systems

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  • Kiil, Astrid

    (COHERE, Department of Business and Economics)

Abstract

This paper reviews the theoretical literature on the demand for private health insurance and its effect on the use of health care services and applies the theoretical framework to the type of private health insurance that exists alongside a universal health care system. The predominant share of the theoretical literature on private health insurance is developed to model private health insurance in settings where this provides the primary source of coverage and the choice is between purchasing private health insurance and going uninsured. This type of private health insurance is termed principal private health insurance in the following. Private health insurance that co-exists with a universal health care system may be classified as complementary, supplementary or duplicate in relation to the universal health care system based on its coverage. Duplicate insurance covers treatments at private hospitals for treatments that are also available through the universal health care system. Complementary insurance covers private copayment for treatments that are only partly financed by but delivered within the universal health care system, and supplementary insurance covers treatments that are excluded from the universal health care system.

Suggested Citation

  • Kiil, Astrid, 2012. "Private health insurance and the use of health care services - a review of the theoretical literature with application to voluntary private health insurance in universal health care systems," DaCHE discussion papers 2012:1, University of Southern Denmark, Dache - Danish Centre for Health Economics.
  • Handle: RePEc:hhs:sduhec:2012_001
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    References listed on IDEAS

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    Cited by:

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    2. Astrid Kiil & Kurt Houlberg, 2014. "How does copayment for health care services affect demand, health and redistribution? A systematic review of the empirical evidence from 1990 to 2011," The European Journal of Health Economics, Springer;Deutsche Gesellschaft für Gesundheitsökonomie (DGGÖ), vol. 15(8), pages 813-828, November.
    3. Astrid Kiil & Jacob Nielsen Arendt, 2017. "The effect of complementary private health insurance on the use of health care services," International Journal of Health Economics and Management, Springer, vol. 17(1), pages 1-27, March.
    4. Md Saiful Islam & Md Sarowar Morshed & Gary J Young & Md Noor-E-Alam, 2019. "Robust policy evaluation from large-scale observational studies," PLOS ONE, Public Library of Science, vol. 14(10), pages 1-19, October.
    5. Jacob Nielsen Arendt, 2012. "The Demand for Health Care by the Poor under Universal Health Care Coverage," Journal of Human Capital, University of Chicago Press, vol. 6(4), pages 316-335.

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Private health insurance;

    JEL classification:

    • I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private

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