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  • Richard B. Freeman

Abstract

The European Union and the United States operate different variants of market capitalism. The EU model uses social dialogue institutions to help determine economic outcomes, particularly in the labor market, whereas the US relies more on market forces. The theory of competitive markets provides a powerful framework for analyzing market driven economies and for assessing the conditions under which unfettered markets yield desirable outcomes. But there is no comparable framework for analyzing institution driven economies. This paper argues that models of efficient bargaining/the Coase Theorem offer the best framework for analyzing social dialogue economies and for identifying policies and institutional reforms to improve their functioning.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 12306.

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Date of creation: Jun 2006
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:12306

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  1. Matthew O. Jackson & Simon Wilkie, 2002. "Endogenous Games and Mechanisms: Side Payments Among Players," Microeconomics 0211008, EconWPA.
  2. Hoffman, Elizabeth & Spitzer, Matthew L, 1982. "The Coase Theorem: Some Experimental Tests," Journal of Law and Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 25(1), pages 73-98, April.
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Cited by:
  1. Chatterji, Monojit, 2008. "Training hold up and social labour markets," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(2), pages 202-214, April.
  2. Boulhol, Herv, 2009. "Do capital market and trade liberalization trigger labor market deregulation?," Journal of International Economics, Elsevier, vol. 77(2), pages 223-233, April.
  3. Richard B. Freeman, 2007. "Labor Market Institutions Around the World," NBER Working Papers 13242, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  4. Schmid, Günther & Modrack, Simone, 2008. "Employment dynamics in Germany: lessons to be learned from the Hartz reforms," Discussion Papers, Research Unit: Labor Market Policy and Employment SP I 2008-102, Social Science Research Center Berlin (WZB).
  5. Hervé Boulhol, 2006. "Do capital market and trade liberalization trigger labor market deregulation ?," Post-Print halshs-00118951, HAL.

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