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Abstract

In a dynamic optimising model with costly tax collection, a tax cut by one nation creates positive externalities for the rest of the world if initial public debt stocks are positive. By reducing tax collection costs, current tax cuts boost the resources available for current private consumption, lowering the global interest rate. This pecuniary externality benefits other countries because it reduces the tax collection costs for foreign governments of current and future debt service. In the non-cooperative equilibrium, nationalistic governments do not allow for the effect of lower domestic taxes on debt service costs abroad. Taxes are too high and government budget deficits too low compared to the global cooperative equilibrium. Even in the cooperative equilibrium complete tax smoothing is not optimal: current taxes will be lower than future taxes.

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Paper provided by National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc in its series NBER Working Papers with number 10110.

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Date of creation: Nov 2003
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Handle: RePEc:nbr:nberwo:10110

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Find related papers by JEL classification:

• E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
• F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

• NEP-ALL-2003-11-30 (All new papers)
• NEP-NET-2003-12-07 (Network Economics)

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Cited by:

1. Beetsma, Roel & Giuliodori, Massimo, 2009. "The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research," CEPR Discussion Papers 7500, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
   
   • Roel Beetsma & Massimo Giuliodori, 2010. "The Macroeconomic Costs and Benefits of the EMU and Other Monetary Unions: An Overview of Recent Research," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 48(3), pages 603-41, September.

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