The purpose of this paper is to provide a methodologyfor computing time-consistent, strategic capital taxes in a largeopen economy and to analyze the nature of these taxes. Our resultssuggest that even if a full set of nondistortionary taxes isunavailable and even if the government has redistributive goals,the country which imports capital should tax corporate capitaland the capital exporter should subsidize it. We perform comparativestatics experiments to show how strategically chosen taxes varywith the parameters of the model. JEL classifications: H21,E62 Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1997
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