In a small open economy, the welfare effect of capital taxation depends on the allocation of the tax revenue as well as the tax system. If tax revenues are used to finance debt or government spending, an increase in either residential or territorial capital taxation will reduce the welfare of the representative individual. If tax revenues are transferred intergenerationally, an increase in the residential capital tax rate will increase the steady-state welfare when the after-tax interest rate is greater than the growth rate. If the revenue is rebated to the tax payer, an introduction of territorial capital taxation may increase welfare when the growth rate is relatively high. In the case where either the revenue from residential capital taxation is rebated to the tax payer or the revenue from territorial capital taxation is transferred intergenerationally, the welfare-maximizing tax rate appears to be zero. Copyright Kluwer Academic Publishers 1998
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