The Welfare Economics Of Cooperative And Noncooperative Fiscal Policy
AbstractIn a competitive two-country overlapping generations model with perfect capital mobility, a plan that is individually Pareto optimal (that is Pareto optimal with respect to individual preferences) can be sustained without coordination of national fiscal policies where the fiscal arsenal is restricted to lump-sum taxes and government borrowing. Cooperation is required to achieve a Pareto optimum with respect to the two utilitarian national social welfare functions. Cooperation and international side payments are required to achieve an optimum with respect to a utilitarian global social welfare functi.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Yale - Economic Growth Center in its series Papers with number 612.
Length: 50 pages
Date of creation: 1990
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fiscal policy ; economic models ; social welfare;
Other versions of this item:
- Buiter, Willem H. & Kletzer, Kenneth M., 1991. "The welfare economics of cooperative and noncooperative fiscal policy," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 15(1), pages 215-244.
- Willem H. Buiter & Kenneth M. Kletzer, 1991. "The Welfare Economics of Cooperative and Noncooperative Fiscal Policy," NBER Working Papers 3329, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
- Buiter, Willem H & Kletzer, Kenneth, 1990. "The Welfare Economics of Cooperative and Uncooperative Fiscal Policy," CEPR Discussion Papers 420, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
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