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Fiscal Policy and Welfare under Different Exchange Rate Regimes

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Author Info
Østrup, Finn (Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School)
Abstract

The article analyses how government spending is determined under different exchange rate regimes in the context of a small open economy. Assuming nominal wage contracts which last for one period and assuming a benevolent government which determines government spending to optimise a representative individual’s utility, it is demonstrated that there are differences between exchange rate regimes with respect to the level of government spending. These differences arise first because a rise in government spending affects macroeconomic variables differently under different exchange rate regimes, and second because the government’s inclination to expand government spending is affected by inflation which depends on the exchange rate regime. At low rates of inflation, the government is inclined to set a higher level of government spending under a fixed exchange rate regime than under a floating exchange rate regime in which the monetary authority optimises preferences which include an employment target and an inflation target. As government spending affects the representative individual’s utility, the choice of exchange rate regime has an impact on welfare.

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File URL: http://openarchive.cbs.dk/cbsweb/handle/10398/7140
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance in its series Working Papers with number 2005-1.

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Length: 26 pages
Date of creation: 19 May 2005
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsfin:2005_001

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Postal: Department of Finance, Copenhagen Business School, Solbjerg Plads 3, A5, DK-2000 Frederiksberg, Denmark
Phone: +45 3815 3815
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Web page: http://www.cbs.dk/departments/finance/
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Related research
Keywords: exchange rate regimes; fiscal policy; monetary union; inflation targeting;

Find related papers by JEL classification:
E42 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Money and Interest Rates - - - Monetary Sytsems; Standards; Regimes; Government and the Monetary System
E61 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Policy Objectives; Policy Designs and Consistency; Policy Coordination
E62 - Macroeconomics and Monetary Economics - - Macroeconomic Policy, Macroeconomic Aspects of Public Finance, and General Outlook - - - Fiscal Policy
F33 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - International Monetary Arrangements and Institutions

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