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The Welfare Economics of Cooperative and Uncooperative Fiscal Policy

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  • Buiter, Willem H
  • Kletzer, Kenneth

Abstract

In a competitive two-country overlapping generations model with perfect capital mobility, a plan that is individually Pareto optimal (that is Pareto optimal with respect to individual preferences) can be sustained without coordination of national fiscal policies where the fiscal arsenal is restricted to lump-sum taxes and government borrowing. Cooperation is required to achieve a Pareto optimum with respect to the two utilitarian national social welfare functions. Cooperation and international side payments are required to achieve an optimum with respect to a utilitarian global social welfare functi.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers in its series CEPR Discussion Papers with number 420.

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Date of creation: May 1990
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Handle: RePEc:cpr:ceprdp:420

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Keywords: Fiscal Policy; Policy Coordination; Social Welfare;

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Cited by:
  1. Erling Steigum, 2001. "Trade Unions and the Burden of the Public Debt," CESifo Working Paper Series 587, CESifo Group Munich.
  2. Steigum Jr, E., 1997. "Fiscal deficits, Asset Prices and Intergenerational Distribution in an Open Unionized Economy," Papers 7/97, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  3. Buiter, Willem H & Sibert, Anne, 2004. "Cross-Border Tax Externalities: Are Budget Deficits too Small?," CEPR Discussion Papers 4164, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  4. Thomas Krichel & Paul Levine & Joseph Pearlman, 1996. "Fiscal and monetary policy in a monetary union: Credible inflation targets or monetized debt?," Review of World Economics (Weltwirtschaftliches Archiv), Springer, vol. 132(1), pages 28-54, March.
  5. Jiming Ha & Anne Sibert, 1992. "Strategic capital taxation in large, open economies with mobile capital," Research Working Paper 92-01, Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City.
  6. Kletzer, Kenneth M., 1997. "Macroeconomic stabilization with a common currency: Does European Monetary Unification create a need for fiscal insurance of federalism?," ZEI Working Papers B 04-1997, ZEI - Center for European Integration Studies, University of Bonn.
  7. Østrup, Finn, 2005. "Fiscal Policy and Welfare under Different Exchange Rate Regimes," Working Papers 2005-1, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Finance.
  8. Yasushi Iwamoto & Akihisa Shibata, 1999. "Foreign Tax Credit and the Current Account," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 6(2), pages 131-148, May.
  9. Arjan Lejour & Harrie Verbon, 1996. "Capital mobility, wage bargaining, and social insurance policies in an economic union," International Tax and Public Finance, Springer, vol. 3(4), pages 495-513, October.
  10. Willem H. Buiter & Anne Sibert, 2011. "Government Budget Deficits in Large Open Economies," CESifo Working Paper Series 3476, CESifo Group Munich.
  11. Kollintzas, Tryphon & Philippopoulos, Apostolis & Vassilatos, Vanghelis, 1999. "Normative Aspects of Fiscal Policy in an Economic Union: a Review," CEPR Discussion Papers 2212, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
  12. Verbic, Miroslav & Majcen, Boris & Cok, Mitja, 2009. "Education and Economic Growth in Slovenia: A Dynamic General Equilibrium Approach with Endogenous Growth," MPRA Paper 17817, University Library of Munich, Germany.

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