Cooperation in Symmetric and Asymmetric Prisoner's Dilemma Games
AbstractWe experimentally study the effect of asymmetry on cooperation in a 40 period prisoner's dilemma game in fixed partner design. We distinguish between a high and low payoff symmetric prisoner's dilemma and an asymmetric game combined out of both symmetric ones. Asymmetry significantly decreases cooperation, as low-type players are more likely to defect after mutual cooperation while high-type players initiate cooperation more often than the former. Asymmetry also has a significant negative effect on the stability of cooperation rendering long sequences of mutual cooperation extremely rare.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods in its series Working Paper Series of the Max Planck Institute for Research on Collective Goods with number 2006_25.
Length: 42 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2007
Date of revision:
Symmetry; Asymmetry; Prisoner's Dilemma; Experiments;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C81 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Data Collection and Data Estimation Methodology; Computer Programs - - - Methodology for Collecting, Estimating, and Organizing Microeconomic Data; Data Access
- D70 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - General
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2007-03-17 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2007-03-17 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2007-03-17 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2007-03-17 (Game Theory)
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