The Problem of Prevention
AbstractMany disasters are foreshadowed by insuficient preventive care. In this paper, we argue that there is a true problem of prevention, in that insu¢ cient care is often the result of rational calculations on the part of agents. We identify two factors that lead to dubious e¤orts in care. First, when objective risks of a disaster are poorly understood, positive experiences may lead to an underestimation of these risks and a corresponding underinvestment in prevention. Second, redundancies designed for safety may lead agents to reduce their care, resulting in a decrease in safety under certain conditions. We also analyze the use of checklists in accident prevention
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Facultad de Ciencias Empresariales y Economia. Universidad de Montevideo. in its series Documentos de Trabajo/Working Papers with number 1111.
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
Overconfidence; Better than Average; Experimental Economics; Irrationality; Signalling Models;
Other versions of this item:
- Benoît, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2006. "The problem of prevention," MPRA Paper 2462, University Library of Munich, Germany, revised 30 Mar 2007.
- Benoit, Jean-Pierre & Dubra, Juan, 2006. "The Problem of Prevention," Working Papers, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University 06-01, C.V. Starr Center for Applied Economics, New York University.
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- D12 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Empirical Analysis
- D82 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Asymmetric and Private Information; Mechanism Design
- D83 - Microeconomics - - Information, Knowledge, and Uncertainty - - - Search, Learning, and Information
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