The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts - A Cross-Country Analysis
AbstractLegal philosophers like Montesquieu, Hegel and Tocqueville have argued that lay participation in judicial decision-making would have benefits reaching far beyond the realm of the legal system narrowly understood. From an economic point of view, lay participation in judicial decision-making can be interpreted as a renunciation of an additional division of labor, which is expected to cause foregone benefits in terms of the costs as well as the quality of judicial decision-making. In order to be justified, these foregone benefits need to be overcompensated by other – actually realized – benefits of at least the same magnitude. This paper discusses pros and cons of lay participation, presents a new database and tests some of the theoretically derived hypotheses empirically. The effects of lay participation on the judicial system, a number of governance variables but also on economic performance indicators are rather modest. A proxy representing historic experiences with any kind of lay participation is the single most robust variable.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung) in its series MAGKS Papers on Economics with number 200820.
Length: 38 pages
Date of creation: 2008
Date of revision:
Publication status: Forthcoming in
Economic Effects of Legal Systems; Judicial Decision-Making; Trial by Jury; Jurors; Lay Assessors; Constitutional Economics; Civil Society; Quality of Governance; History of Thought;
Other versions of this item:
- Stefan Voigt, 2008. "The (Economic) Effects of Lay Participation in Courts – A Cross-Country Analysis," CESifo Working Paper Series 2365, CESifo Group Munich.
- B15 - Schools of Economic Thought and Methodology - - History of Economic Thought through 1925 - - - Historical; Institutional; Evolutionary
- H11 - Public Economics - - Structure and Scope of Government - - - Structure and Scope of Government
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
- H73 - Public Economics - - State and Local Government; Intergovernmental Relations - - - Interjurisdictional Differentials and Their Effects
- K41 - Law and Economics - - Legal Procedure, the Legal System, and Illegal Behavior - - - Litigation Process
- P51 - Economic Systems - - Comparative Economic Systems - - - Comparative Analysis of Economic Systems
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