This file is part of IDEAS, which uses RePEc data


[ Papers | Articles | Software | Books | Chapters | Authors | Institutions | JEL Classification | NEP reports | Search | New papers by email | Author registration | Rankings | Volunteers | FAQ | Blog | Help! ]

Courts: The Lex Mundi Project

Author info | Abstract | Publisher info | Download info | Related research | Statistics
Author Info
Simeon Djankov
Rafael La Porta
Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes
Andrei Shleifer

Additional information is available for the following registered author(s):

Abstract

In cooperation with Lex Mundi member law firms in 109 countries, we measure and describe the exact procedures used by litigants and courts to evict a tenant for non-payment of rent and to collect a bounced check. We use these data to construct an index of procedural formalism of dispute resolution for each country. We find that such formalism is systematically greater in civil than in common law countries. Moreover, procedural formalism is associated with higher expected duration of judicial proceedings, more corruption, less consistency, less honesty, less fairness in judicial decisions, and inferior access to justice. These results suggest that legal transplantation may have led to an inefficiently high level of procedural formalism, particularly in developing countries.

Download Info
To download:

If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. Information about this may be contained in the File-Format links below. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.

File URL: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/pub/hier/2002/HIER1951.pdf
File Format: application/pdf
File Function:
Download Restriction: no

Publisher Info
Paper provided by Harvard - Institute of Economic Research in its series Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers with number 1951.

Download reference. The following formats are available: HTML (with abstract), plain text (with abstract), BibTeX, RIS (EndNote, RefMan, ProCite), ReDIF
Length:
Date of creation: 2002
Date of revision:
Handle: RePEc:fth:harver:1951

Contact details of provider:
Postal: 200 Littauer Center, Cambridge, MA 02138
Web page: http://www.economics.harvard.edu/journals/hier
More information through EDIRC

For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its listing, contact: (Thomas Krichel).

Related research
Keywords:

Other versions of this item:

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
  1. La Porta, Rafael & Lopez-de-Silanes, Florencio & Shleifer, Andrei & Vishny, Robert, 1999. "The Quality of Government," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 15(1), pages 222-79, April.
    Other versions:
  2. Simon Johnson & John McMillan, 2002. "Courts and Relational Contracts," Journal of Law, Economics and Organization, Oxford University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 221-277, April.
    Other versions:
  3. Philippe Aghion & Alberto Alesina & Francesco Trebbi, 2002. "Endogenous Political Institutions," NBER Working Papers 9006, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  4. Messick, Richard E, 1999. "Judicial Reform and Economic Development: A Survey of the Issues," World Bank Research Observer, Oxford University Press, vol. 14(1), pages 117-36, February. [Downloadable!]
  5. Daniel Berkowitz & Karina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, 2001. "Economic Development, Legality, and the Transplant Effect," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 410, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  6. Rafael LaPorta & Florencio Lopez de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1997. "Legal Determinants of External Finance," Harvard Institute of Economic Research Working Papers 1788, Harvard - Institute of Economic Research.
    Other versions:
  7. Grossman, Sanford J & Hart, Oliver D, 1986. "The Costs and Benefits of Ownership: A Theory of Vertical and Lateral Integration," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 94(4), pages 691-719, August. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  8. Simeon Djankov & Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-De-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Regulation Of Entry," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(1), pages 1-37, February. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  9. Rafael La Porta & Florencio Lopez-de-Silanes & Andrei Shleifer & Robert W. Vishny, 1998. "Law and Finance," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(6), pages 1113-1155, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  10. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "Legal Origins," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, vol. 117(4), pages 1193-1229, November. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Full references

Cited by:
(explanations, Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.)

  1. Beck, Thorsten, 2006. "Creating an efficient financial system : challenges in a global economy," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3856, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  2. Miguel St. Aubyn, 2008. "Law and Order Efficiency Measurement – A Literature Review," Working Papers 2008/19, Department of Economics at the School of Economics and Management (ISEG), Technical University of Lisbon.. [Downloadable!]
  3. Mihir Desai & Paul Gompers & Josh Lerner, 2003. "Institutions, Capital Constraints and Entrepreneurial Firm Dynamics: Evidence from Europe," NBER Working Papers 10165, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  4. Lerner, Josh & Schoar, Antoinette, 2004. "Transaction Structures in the Developing World: Evidence from Private Equity," Working papers 4468-04, Massachusetts Institute of Technology (MIT), Sloan School of Management. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  5. Norman Loayza & Raimundo Soto, 2003. "Market-Oriented Reforms: Definitions and Measurement," Documentos de Trabajo 237, Instituto de Economía. Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile.. [Downloadable!]
  6. Gillian Hadfield, . "Contract Law is Not Enough: The Many Legal Institutions That Support Contractual Commitments," University of Southern California Legal Working Paper Series usclwps-1003, University of Southern California Law School. [Downloadable!]
  7. Beck, Thorsten & Demirguc-Kunt, Asli & Levine, Ross, 2002. "Law and finance : why does legal origin matter?," Policy Research Working Paper Series 2904, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  8. Josh Lerner & Antoinette Schoar, 2004. "Transaction Structures in the Developing World," NBER Working Papers 10348, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  9. Bolt, Jutta & Bezemer, Dirk, 2008. "Understanding Long-Run African Growth: Colonial Institutions or Colonial Education? Evidence from a New Data Set," MPRA Paper 7029, University Library of Munich, Germany. [Downloadable!]
  10. Konstantin Sonin, 2002. "Why the Rich May Favor Poor Protection of Property Rights," William Davidson Institute Working Papers Series 544, William Davidson Institute at the University of Michigan Stephen M. Ross Business School. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  11. Luigi Zingales & Raghuram G. Rajan, 2003. "Banks and Markets: The Changing Character of European Finance," NBER Working Papers 9595, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
  12. Steven Globerman & Daniel Shapiro, 2004. "Governance Infrastructure and U.S. Foreign Direct Investment," International Finance 0404008, EconWPA. [Downloadable!]
  13. Kaplan, Steven N. & Martel, Frederic & Strömberg, Per, 2004. "How Do Legal Differences and Learning Affect Financial Contracts?," SIFR Research Report Series 28, Institute for Financial Research. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  14. Stefan Voigt & Lorenz Blume, . "Wenn Justitia die Hand aufhält – Ursachen und Folgen korrupter Justizbehörden," German Working Papers in Law and Economics 2005-1-1133, Berkeley Electronic Press. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  15. Pedro Amaral & Erwan Quintin, 2004. "The implications of capital-skill complementarity in economies with large informal sectors," Center for Latin America Working Papers 0404, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  16. Ahmet Akyol & Kartik Athreya, 2009. "Self-employment rates and business size: the roles of occupational choice and credit market frictions," Annals of Finance, Springer, vol. 5(3), pages 495-519, June. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
  17. Tullio Jappelli & Luigi Pistaferri, 2002. "Tax Incentives for Household Saving and Borrowing," CSEF Working Papers 83, Centre for Studies in Economics and Finance (CSEF), University of Naples, Italy. [Downloadable!]
  18. Duebel, Hans-Joachim & Brzeski, W. Jan & Hamilton, Ellen, 2006. "Rental choice and housing policy realignment in transition : post-privatization challenges in the Europe and Central Asia region," Policy Research Working Paper Series 3884, The World Bank. [Downloadable!]
  19. Erwan Quintin, 2001. "Limited enforcement and the organization of production," Center for Latin America Working Papers 0601, Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas. [Downloadable!]
    Other versions:
  20. Edward L. Glaeser & Andrei Shleifer, 2002. "The Injustice of Inequality," NBER Working Papers 9150, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
    Other versions:
Statistics
Access and download statistics

Did you know? To receive notification of recent additions to the database, subscribe to the free NEP reports.

This page was last updated on 2009-11-5.

This information is provided to you by IDEAS at the Department of Economics, College of Liberal Arts and Sciences, University of Connecticut using RePEc data on a server sponsored by the Society for Economic Dynamics.