A Sensitive Flexible Network Approach
AbstractThis paper takes an axiomatic approach to find rules for allocating the value of a network when the externalities generated across components are identifiable. Two new, and different, allocation rules are defined and characterized in this context. The first one is an extension of the player-based flexible-network allocation rule (Jackson (2005)). The second one follows the flexible network approach from a component-wise point of view, where the notion of network flexibility is adjusted with a flavor of core stability. Furthermore, two other allocation rules are proposed by relaxing the axiom of equal treatment of vital players. These collapse into the player-based flexible-network allocation rule (Jackson (2005)) for zero-normalized value functions with no externalities across components.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Universidad de Málaga, Department of Economic Theory, Málaga Economic Theory Research Center in its series Working Papers with number 2008-2.
Length: 29 pages
Date of creation: Mar 2008
Date of revision: Sep 2008
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More information through EDIRC
allocation rules; networks; player-based flexible-network allocation rule; Myerson value;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C71 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Cooperative Games
- C79 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Other
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2008-03-25 (All new papers)
- NEP-GTH-2008-03-25 (Game Theory)
- NEP-NET-2008-03-25 (Network Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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1160, California Institute of Technology, Division of the Humanities and Social Sciences.
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"Unique stability in simple coalition formation games,"
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- Szilvia Papai, 2000. "Unique Stability in Simple Coalition Formation Games," Econometric Society World Congress 2000 Contributed Papers 1537, Econometric Society.
- Navarro, Noemi, 2007. "Fair allocation in networks with externalities," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 58(2), pages 354-364, February.
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