Male-Female Productivity Differentials: the Role of Ability and Incentives
AbstractWe consider the response to incentives as an explanation for productivity differences within a firm that paid its workers piece rates. We provide a framework within which observed productivity differences can be decomposed into two parts: one due to differences in ability and the other due to differences in the response to incentives. We apply this decomposition to male and female workers a tree-planting firm in the province of British Columbia, Canada. We provide evidence that individuals do react differently to incentives. However, while the women in our sample reacted slightly more to incentives than did the men, the average difference is not statistically significant. The productivity differential that men enjoyed arose because of differences in ability, strength in our application.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Université Laval - Département d'économique in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0401.
Date of creation: 2004
Date of revision:
Productivity; Gender; Compensation; Incentives;
Other versions of this item:
- Harry J. Paarsch & Bruce S. Shearer, 2004. "Male-Female Productivity Differentials: The Role of Ability and Incentives," CIRANO Working Papers 2004s-17, CIRANO.
- D2 - Microeconomics - - Production and Organizations
- J16 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demographic Economics - - - Economics of Gender; Non-labor Discrimination
- J3 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs
- L2 - Industrial Organization - - Firm Objectives, Organization, and Behavior
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