Warlords, Famine and Food Aid: Who Fights, Who Starves?
AbstractWe examine the effects of famine relief efforts (food aid) in regions undergoing civil war. In our model, warlords seize a fraction of all aid and use it to feed soldiers. They hire their troops within a population of farmers heterogeneous in skills. We determine the equilibrium distribution of labor in this environment and study how the existence and allocation strategies of a benevolent food aid agency affect this equilibrium. Our model allows us to precisely predict who will fight and who will work in every circumstance.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0947.
Date of creation: 2009
Date of revision:
Food aid; civil war; warlords; famine;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- O10 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Economic Development - - - General
- F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
- D74 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Conflict; Conflict Resolution; Alliances
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