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Addressing the Food Aid Curse

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Author Info
Max Blouin
Stéphane Pallage

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Abstract

In this paper, we build a model of agrarian economies in which a kleptocratic government taxes farmers to maximize its life-time utility. The model is a dynamic general equilibrium model in which the subsistence of farmers requires a minimum level of consumption. We analyze the effect that a benevolent food aid agency can have in such an environment. If it expects the food aid agency to intervene, the kleptocratic government will starve its farmers, in a clear case of the Samaritan's dilemma. We show that the likelihood of man-made famines, however, can be greatly reduced if the food aid agency intervenes with probability slightly lower than one. No aid agency devoted to saving lives, however, can commit to such policy. We propose a solution to this food aid curse.

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Paper provided by CIRPEE in its series Cahiers de recherche with number 0717.

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Date of creation: 2007
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Handle: RePEc:lvl:lacicr:0717

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Related research
Keywords: Food aid famines commitment

Find related papers by JEL classification:
F35 - International Economics - - International Finance - - - Foreign Aid
D72 - Microeconomics - - Analysis of Collective Decision-Making - - - Models of Political Processes: Rent-seeking, Elections, Legislatures, and Voting Behavior
C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games

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  1. Max Blouin & Stéphane Pallage, 2007. "Humanitarian Relief and Civil Conflict," Cahiers de recherche 0706, CIRPEE. [Downloadable!]
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This page was last updated on 2008-6-18.


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