The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of State International Environmental Agreements
AbstractThis paper extends the standard model of self-enforcing dynamic international environmental agreements by allowing the length of the period of commitment of such agreements to vary as a parameter. It analyzes the pattern of behavior of the size of stable coalitions, the stock of pollution, and the emission rate as a function of the length of the period of commitment. It is shown that the length of the period of commitment can have very significant effects on the equilibrium. We show numerically that at the initial date, as the length of commitment is increased, the potential gain from cooperation tends to diminish, increasing the disincentive to ratify the agreements. This suggests that considerable attention should be given to the determination of the length of such international agreements.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by CREATE in its series Cahiers de recherche CREATE with number 2012-7.
Date of creation: 2012
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International environmental agreements; global pollution; stock pollution; dynamc games;
Other versions of this item:
- Bruno Nkuiya, 2012. "The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 411-430, December.
- Nkuiya, Bruno, 2012. "The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 132419, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
- Q5 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - Environmental Economics
- C73 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Stochastic and Dynamic Games; Evolutionary Games
- F53 - International Economics - - International Relations and International Political Economy - - - International Agreements and Observance; International Organizations
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2012-09-09 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-09-09 (Environmental Economics)
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- Van Long Ngo, 2010. "A Survey Of Dynamic Games In Economics:," World Scientific Books, World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte. Ltd., volume 1, number 7577.
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