International environmental agreements under endogenous uncertainty
AbstractThis paper explores the implications of the possibility of a shift in environmental damages on the participation in environmental treaties. Using a two-period model where the probability of a regime shift increases with the first-period emissions, we examine the issue of coalition formation under both fixed and dynamic membership. Our analysis suggests that endogenous uncertainty may increase participation. Moreover, we find that full cooperation may be sustained, but only in the presence of endogenous uncertainty. Interestingly, when the shift in the environmental damage is large enough, the model provides a way to solve the "puzzle of small coalitions" found in the literature related to International Environmental Agreements (IEAs).
Download InfoIf you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Virginia Polytechnic Institute and State University, Department of Economics in its series Working Papers with number e07-32.
Length: 32 pages
Date of creation: 2011
Date of revision:
International Environmental Agreements; Endogenous Uncertainty; Emissions; Shift in Damage.;
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-03-14 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2012-03-14 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2012-03-14 (Environmental Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Boucher, Vincent & Bramoullé, Yann, 2010. "Providing global public goods under uncertainty," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 94(9-10), pages 591-603, October.
- Bruno Nkuiya, 2012.
"The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of State International Environmental Agreements,"
Cahiers de recherche CREATE
- Bruno Nkuiya, 2012. "The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements," Dynamic Games and Applications, Springer, vol. 2(4), pages 411-430, December.
- Nkuiya, Bruno, 2012. "The Effects of the Length of the Period of Commitment on the Size of Stable International Environmental Agreements," Working Papers 132419, University of Laval, Center for Research on the Economics of the Environment, Agri-food, Transports and Energy (CREATE).
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Djavad Salehi-Isfahani).
If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.