Systemic Risk and the European Banking Sector
AbstractSystemic risk is the risk of a collapse of the entire financial system, typically triggered by the default of one, or more, large and interconnected financial institutions. In this paper we estimate the systemic risk contribution of each financial institution in a large sample of European banks. We follow a recent methodology first proposed by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2011) based on the CoVaR and find that size is a predictor of a bank contribution to systemic risk, but it is not the only one. Leverage is important as well. Also, banks that have their headquarters in countries with a more concentrated banking system tend to contribute more to European wide systemic risk, even after controlling for their size. Therefore, any financial regulation designed only to curb banksÕ size would not completely eliminate systemic risk. On average, balance sheet variables are very weak predictors of banksÕ contribution to systemic risk, if compared to market based variables. Accounting rules provide enough degrees of freedom to make balance sheet less informative than market prices. As a result, measures of risk based on higher frequency market prices are more likely to anticipate systemic risk.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Dipartimento di Economia e Finanza, LUISS Guido Carli in its series Working Papers CASMEF with number 1211.
Date of creation: 2012
Date of revision:
Systemic Risk; SIFIs; European Banking System; CoVaR.;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- G01 - Financial Economics - - General - - - Financial Crises
- G18 - Financial Economics - - General Financial Markets - - - Government Policy and Regulation
- G21 - Financial Economics - - Financial Institutions and Services - - - Banks; Other Depository Institutions; Micro Finance Institutions; Mortgages
- G32 - Financial Economics - - Corporate Finance and Governance - - - Financing Policy; Financial Risk and Risk Management; Capital and Ownership Structure; Value of Firms; Goodwill
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2012-09-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-BAN-2012-09-09 (Banking)
- NEP-CBA-2012-09-09 (Central Banking)
- NEP-EEC-2012-09-09 (European Economics)
- NEP-NET-2012-09-09 (Network Economics)
- NEP-RMG-2012-09-09 (Risk Management)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Sheri Markose & Simone Giansante & Mateusz Gatkowski & Ali Rais Shaghaghi, 2010.
"Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk in Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks,"
Economics Discussion Papers
683, University of Essex, Department of Economics.
- Sheri Markose & Simone Giansante & Mateusz Gatkowski & Ali Rais Shaghaghi, 2010. "Too Interconnected To Fail: Financial Contagion and Systemic Risk In Network Model of CDS and Other Credit Enhancement Obligations of US Banks," Working Papers 033, COMISEF.
- Stefano Giglio, 2011. "Credit default swap spreads and systemic financial risk," Proceedings 1122, Federal Reserve Bank of Chicago.
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