The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?

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The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?

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Wolfgang Leininger
Axel Ockenfels

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Axel Ockenfels

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Paper provided by University of Cologne, Department of Economics in its series Working Paper Series in Economics with number 34.

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Date of creation: 03 Aug 2007
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Handle: RePEc:kls:series:0034

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Paper
- Wolfgang Leininger & Axel Ockenfels, 2007. "The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?," Ruhr Economic Papers 0004, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen. [Downloadable!]
- Leininger, Wolfgang / Ockenfels, Axel, 2008. "The Penalty-Duel and Institutional Design: Is there a Neeskens-Effect?," CESifo Working Paper Series CESifo Working Paper No. , CESifo Group Munich. [Downloadable!]

This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

NEP-ALL-2007-09-02 (All new papers)

References listed on IDEAS
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:

Moschini, GianCarlo, 2004. "Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games: live play in soccer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 365-371, December. [Downloadable!] (restricted)
Other versions:
- Moschini, GianCarlo, 2005. "Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games: Live Play in Soccer," Staff General Research Papers 12312, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
G Th, Werner & Ockenfels, Axel, 2005. "The coevolution of morality and legal institutions: an indirect evolutionary approach," Journal of Institutional Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 1(02), pages 155-174, December. [Downloadable!]
Other versions:
- Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, . "The Coevolution of Morality and Legal Institutions - An indirect evolutionary approach -," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-06, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]
Werner Güth & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "The Coevolution of Trust and Institutions in Anonymous and Non-anonymous Communities," Papers on Strategic Interaction 2002-07, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group. [Downloadable!]

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