Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games: Live Play in Soccer
AbstractI model a scoring situation that arises frequently during soccer matches. The Nash equilibrium solution is shown to be broadly consistent with the conventional wisdom of experts. Data on goals scored over an entire season in Italyï¾’s soccer league provide statistical support for a prediction of the modelï¾’s Nash equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Iowa State University, Department of Economics in its series Staff General Research Papers with number 12312.
Date of creation: 01 Dec 2004
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published in Economics Letters, December 2004, vol. 85 no. 3, pp. 365-371
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Postal: Iowa State University, Dept. of Economics, 260 Heady Hall, Ames, IA 50011-1070
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Web page: http://www.econ.iastate.edu
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Other versions of this item:
- Moschini, GianCarlo, 2004. "Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games: live play in soccer," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 85(3), pages 365-371, December.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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