Nash equilibrium in strictly competitive games: live play in soccer
AbstractI model a scoring situation that arises frequently during soccer matches. The Nash equilibrium solution is shown to be broadly consistent with the conventional wisdom of experts. Data on goals scored over an entire season in ItalyÃ¯Â¾âs soccer league provide statistical support for a prediction of the modelÃ¯Â¾âs Nash equilibrium.
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Bibliographic InfoArticle provided by Elsevier in its journal Economics Letters.
Volume (Year): 85 (2004)
Issue (Month): 3 (December)
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Web page: http://www.elsevier.com/locate/ecolet
Other versions of this item:
- Moschini, GianCarlo, 2004. "Nash Equilibrium in Strictly Competitive Games: Live Play in Soccer," Staff General Research Papers 12312, Iowa State University, Department of Economics.
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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