IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/p/iza/izadps/dp8854.html
   My bibliography  Save this paper

How Many Educated Workers for Your Economy? European Targets, Optimal Public Spending, and Labor Market Impact

Author

Listed:
  • Lebon, Isabelle

    (University of Caen)

  • Rebiere, Therese

    (CNAM, Paris)

Abstract

This paper studies optimal taxation schemes for education in a search-matching model where the labor market is divided between a high-skill and a low-skill sector. Two public policy targets – maximizing the global employment level and optimizing the social surplus – are studied according to three different public taxation strategies. We calibrate our model using evidence from fourteen European countries, and compare our results with the target from the Europe 2020 Agenda for achievement in higher education. We show that, with current labor market characteristics, the target set by governments seems compatible with the social surplus maximization objective in some countries, while being too high for other countries. For all countries, maximizing employment would imply higher educational spending than that required for the social surplus to reach its maximum.

Suggested Citation

  • Lebon, Isabelle & Rebiere, Therese, 2015. "How Many Educated Workers for Your Economy? European Targets, Optimal Public Spending, and Labor Market Impact," IZA Discussion Papers 8854, Institute of Labor Economics (IZA).
  • Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8854
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://docs.iza.org/dp8854.pdf
    Download Restriction: no
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Marcus Hagedorn & Iourii Manovskii, 2008. "The Cyclical Behavior of Equilibrium Unemployment and Vacancies Revisited," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 98(4), pages 1692-1706, September.
    2. Sylwester, Kevin, 2002. "Can education expenditures reduce income inequality?," Economics of Education Review, Elsevier, vol. 21(1), pages 43-52, February.
    3. Holmlund, Bertil, 1998. " Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 113-141, March.
    4. Mikael Lindahl & Alan B. Krueger, 2001. "Education for Growth: Why and for Whom?," Journal of Economic Literature, American Economic Association, vol. 39(4), pages 1101-1136, December.
    5. Brenzel, Hanna & Gartner, Hermann & Schnabel, Claus, 2014. "Wage bargaining or wage posting? Evidence from the employers' side," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 29(C), pages 41-48.
    6. Kaganovich, Michael & Zilcha, Itzhak, 1999. "Education, social security, and growth," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 71(2), pages 289-309, February.
    7. Lars Ljungqvist & Thomas J. Sargent, 1998. "The European Unemployment Dilemma," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 106(3), pages 514-550, June.
    8. Zhang, Jie & Zhang, Junsen, 2007. "Optimal social security in a dynastic model with investment externalities and endogenous fertility," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 31(11), pages 3545-3567, November.
    9. Frédéric Gavrel & Isabelle Lebon & Therese Rebière, 2010. "Career Paths, Unemployment, and the Efficiency of the Labor Market: Should Youth Employment Be Subsidized?," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 12(3), pages 533-560, June.
    10. Roland Benabou, 2002. "Tax and Education Policy in a Heterogeneous-Agent Economy: What Levels of Redistribution Maximize Growth and Efficiency?," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 70(2), pages 481-517, March.
    11. Robert E. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, 2012. "Evidence on the Incidence of Wage Posting, Wage Bargaining, and On-the-Job Search," American Economic Journal: Macroeconomics, American Economic Association, vol. 4(4), pages 56-67, October.
    12. Blankenau, William F. & Simpson, Nicole B., 2004. "Public education expenditures and growth," Journal of Development Economics, Elsevier, vol. 73(2), pages 583-605, April.
    13. Christopher A. Pissarides, 2000. "Equilibrium Unemployment Theory, 2nd Edition," MIT Press Books, The MIT Press, edition 1, volume 1, number 0262161877, December.
    14. Robert E. Hall & Alan B. Krueger, 2010. "Evidence on the Determinants of the Choice between Wage Posting and Wage Bargaining," NBER Working Papers 16033, National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
    15. Acemoglu, Daron, 2001. "Good Jobs versus Bad Jobs," Journal of Labor Economics, University of Chicago Press, vol. 19(1), pages 1-21, January.
    16. Christopher Flinn & Joseph Mullins, 2015. "Labor Market Search And Schooling Investment," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 56, pages 359-398, May.
    17. Bertil Holmlund, 1998. "Unemployment Insurance in Theory and Practice," Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 100(1), pages 113-141, March.
    18. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    19. Sano, Koichiro & Tomoda, Yasunobu, 2010. "Optimal public education policy in a two sector model," Economic Modelling, Elsevier, vol. 27(5), pages 991-995, September.
    20. Yew, Siew Ling & Zhang, Jie, 2013. "Socially optimal social security and education subsidization in a dynastic model with human capital externalities, fertility and endogenous growth," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 37(1), pages 154-175.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Ivan A. Kapitonov, 2020. "Transformation of social environment in the application of alternative energy sources," Environment, Development and Sustainability: A Multidisciplinary Approach to the Theory and Practice of Sustainable Development, Springer, vol. 22(8), pages 7683-7700, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. Therese REBIERE & Isabelle LEBON, 2015. "How many educated workers do you wish for your economy? European targets, optimal public spending, and labor market impact," EcoMod2015 8361, EcoMod.
    2. Engelhardt, Bryan & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Rupert, Peter, 2008. "Crime and the labor market: A search model with optimal contracts," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 92(10-11), pages 1876-1891, October.
    3. Stephen Tapp, 2011. "Lost in transition: the costs and consequences of sectoral labour adjustment," Canadian Journal of Economics, Canadian Economics Association, vol. 44(4), pages 1264-1296, November.
    4. Engelhardt, Bryan & Rocheteau, Guillaume & Rupert, Peter, 2007. "Crime and the Labor Market in a Search Model with Pairwise-Efficient Separations," University of California at Santa Barbara, Economics Working Paper Series qt72r6g75d, Department of Economics, UC Santa Barbara.
    5. Gavrel, Frédéric, 2009. "Technical skill bias as a response of firms to unemployment: A matching model with applicant ranking and endogenous skill requirements," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 16(3), pages 304-310, June.
    6. Toshihiko Mukoyama, 2019. "Heterogeneous Jobs and the Aggregate Labour Market," The Japanese Economic Review, Springer, vol. 70(1), pages 30-50, March.
    7. Costain, James S. & Reiter, Michael, 2008. "Business cycles, unemployment insurance, and the calibration of matching models," Journal of Economic Dynamics and Control, Elsevier, vol. 32(4), pages 1120-1155, April.
    8. Yashiv, Eran, 2007. "Labor search and matching in macroeconomics," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 51(8), pages 1859-1895, November.
    9. Simon Jäger & Benjamin Schoefer & Samuel Young & Josef Zweimüller, 2020. "Wages and the Value of Nonemployment," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, President and Fellows of Harvard College, vol. 135(4), pages 1905-1963.
    10. Saez, Emmanuel & Landais, Camille & Michaillat, Pascal, 2010. "Optimal Unemployment Insurance over the Business Cycle," CEPR Discussion Papers 8132, C.E.P.R. Discussion Papers.
    11. Gomme, Paul & Lkhagvasuren, Damba, 2015. "Worker search effort as an amplification mechanism," Journal of Monetary Economics, Elsevier, vol. 75(C), pages 106-122.
    12. Gavrel, Frédéric, 2012. "On the inefficiency of matching models of unemployment with heterogeneous workers and jobs when firms rank their applicants," European Economic Review, Elsevier, vol. 56(8), pages 1746-1758.
    13. Burkhard Heer & Albrecht Morgenstern, 2005. "The Labor Market Effects of Indexing Unemployment Benefits to Previous Earnings," Public Finance Review, , vol. 33(3), pages 385-402, May.
    14. Marimon, Ramon & Zilibotti, Fabrizio, 1999. "Unemployment vs. Mismatch of Talents: Reconsidering Unemployment Benefits," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 109(455), pages 266-291, April.
    15. Etienne Lehmann & Bruno Van Der Linden, 2007. "On the Optimality of Search Matching Equilibrium When Workers Are Risk Averse," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 9(5), pages 867-884, October.
    16. Gavrel, Frédéric, 2011. "On the efficiency of participation with vertically differentiated workers," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 112(1), pages 100-102, July.
    17. Hertweck Matthias Sebastian, 2013. "Strategic wage bargaining, labor market volatility, and persistence," The B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics, De Gruyter, vol. 13(1), pages 1-27, October.
    18. Felbermayr, Gabriel J. & Larch, Mario & Lechthaler, Wolfgang, 2012. "Endogenous labor market institutions in an open economy," International Review of Economics & Finance, Elsevier, vol. 23(C), pages 30-45.
    19. Darong Dai & Guoqiang Tian, 2020. "On the Efficiency of Wage-Setting Mechanisms with Search Frictions and Human Capital Investment," Annals of Economics and Finance, Society for AEF, vol. 21(1), pages 1-40, May.
    20. Coles, Melvyn, 2008. "Optimal unemployment policy in a matching equilibrium," Labour Economics, Elsevier, vol. 15(4), pages 537-559, August.

    More about this item

    Keywords

    educational policy; job search; matching model; optimal taxation;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • H21 - Public Economics - - Taxation, Subsidies, and Revenue - - - Efficiency; Optimal Taxation
    • H52 - Public Economics - - National Government Expenditures and Related Policies - - - Government Expenditures and Education
    • J21 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - Labor Force and Employment, Size, and Structure
    • J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search

    NEP fields

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp8854. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Holger Hinte (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/izaaade.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.