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Why Are Married Men Working So Much? Home Production, Household Bargaining and Per-Capita Hours

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  • Knowles, John

    ()
    (University of Southampton)

Abstract

Empirical patterns of labor supply at the micro level tend to reject the unitary model assumption implicit in most macro theories, where households are the deemed to be rational agents. This paper examines the rise in per-capita labor since 1975 and asks how the inclusion of bargaining between spouses in a standard macro model would alter the analysis of recent trends in aggregate labor supply. The main findings are that the stationarity of married men’s work hours reflects weakening of men’s bargaining position as women’s wages rose, and that the unitary model seriously overstates the response of aggregate labor to trends in relative wages.

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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2909.

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Length: 45 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2007
Date of revision:
Publication status: published in: Review of Economic Studies, 2013, 80 (3), 1055-1085
Handle: RePEc:iza:izadps:dp2909

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Related research

Keywords: general aggregative models: neoclassical; time allocation and labor supply; economics of gender; marriage; marital dissolution;

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References

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  1. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner, 2009. "Marriage and Divorce since World War II: Analyzing the Role of Technological Progress on the Formation of Households," NBER Chapters, in: NBER Macroeconomics Annual 2008, Volume 23, pages 231-276 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  2. Rupert, Peter & Rogerson, Richard & Wright, Randall, 1995. "Estimating Substitution Elasticities in Household Production Models," Economic Theory, Springer, Springer, vol. 6(1), pages 179-93, June.
  3. Chiappori, P.A. & Weiss, Y., 2000. "An Equilibrium Analysis of Divorce," Papers, Tel Aviv 2000-18, Tel Aviv.
  4. Jeremy Greenwood & Nezih Guner & John A. Knowles, 2003. "More on Marriage, Fertility, and the Distribution of Income," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 44(3), pages 827-862, 08.
  5. Edward C. Prescott, 2003. "Why do Americans work so much more than Europeans?," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 321, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  6. Browning, Martin & Francois Bourguignon & Pierre-Andre Chiappori & Valerie Lechene, 1994. "Income and Outcomes: A Structural Model of Intrahousehold Allocation," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, University of Chicago Press, vol. 102(6), pages 1067-96, December.
  7. Chiappori, P.A., 1994. "Introducing Household Production in Collective Models of Labour Suply," DELTA Working Papers, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure) 94-18, DELTA (Ecole normale supérieure).
  8. Larry E. Jones & Rodolfo E. Manuelli & Ellen R. McGrattan, 2003. "Why are married women working so much?," Staff Report, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis 317, Federal Reserve Bank of Minneapolis.
  9. Hector Chade & Gustavo Ventura, 2000. "Taxes and Marriage: A Two-Sided Search Analysis," UWO Department of Economics Working Papers, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics 200015, University of Western Ontario, Department of Economics.
  10. Greenwood,J. & Seshadri,A. & Yorukoglu,M., 2002. "Engines of liberation," Working papers, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems 1, Wisconsin Madison - Social Systems.
  11. Francine D. Blau & Lawrence M. Kahn, 2000. "Gender Differences in Pay," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 14(4), pages 75-99, Fall.
  12. Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, 2006. "Measuring trends in leisure," Proceedings, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco, Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco.
  13. McElroy, Marjorie B & Horney, Mary Jean, 1981. "Nash-Bargained Household Decisions: Toward a Generalization of the Theory of Demand," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 22(2), pages 333-49, June.
  14. Manser, Marilyn & Brown, Murray, 1980. "Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis," International Economic Review, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, Department of Economics, University of Pennsylvania and Osaka University Institute of Social and Economic Research Association, vol. 21(1), pages 31-44, February.
  15. Shelly Lundberg & Robert A. Pollak, 1996. "Bargaining and Distribution in Marriage," Journal of Economic Perspectives, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 10(4), pages 139-158, Fall.
  16. Elizabeth M. Caucutt & Nezih Guner & John Knowles, 2002. "Why Do Women Wait? Matching, Wage Inequality, and the Incentives for Fertility Delay," Review of Economic Dynamics, Elsevier for the Society for Economic Dynamics, vol. 5(4), pages 815-855, October.
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Citations

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Cited by:
  1. Matthias Doepke & Michele Tertilt, 2008. "Women's Liberation: What's in It for Men?," Discussion Papers, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research 07-037, Stanford Institute for Economic Policy Research.
  2. Larry E. Jones & Alice Schoonbroodt & Michèle Tertilt, 2010. "Fertility Theories: Can They Explain the Negative Fertility-Income Relationship?," NBER Chapters, in: Demography and the Economy, pages 43-100 National Bureau of Economic Research, Inc.
  3. Giovanni Gallipoli & Laura Turner, 2009. "Household Responses to Individual Shocks: Disability and Labor Supply," Working Paper Series, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis 04_09, The Rimini Centre for Economic Analysis.
  4. Christian Bredemeier & Falko Jüßen, 2009. "Household Labor Supply and Home Services in a General-Equilibrium Model with Heterogeneous Agents," Ruhr Economic Papers, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen 0091, Rheinisch-Westfälisches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, Ruhr-Universität Bochum, Universität Dortmund, Universität Duisburg-Essen.
  5. Laura Turner & Giovanni Gallipoli, 2010. "Household Responses to Individual Shocks: Disability, Labour Supply," 2010 Meeting Papers, Society for Economic Dynamics 110, Society for Economic Dynamics.

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