Friendship in a Public Good Experiment
AbstractWe conduct a public good experiment with high school teenagers. Some groups exclusively consist of students that we know to be friends. Other groups exclusively consist of students that we know not to be friends, and that are mere classmates. We find that ‘friends’ contribute more to the public good than ‘classmates’ do. Contributions of ‘classmates’ sharply decrease in the last round, in line with the literature on public good experiments. However, contributions of ‘friends’ sharply increase in the last round.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA) in its series IZA Discussion Papers with number 2108.
Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Apr 2006
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Find related papers by JEL classification:
- C91 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Individual Behavior
- C92 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Design of Experiments - - - Laboratory, Group Behavior
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2006-05-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-CBE-2006-05-13 (Cognitive & Behavioural Economics)
- NEP-EXP-2006-05-13 (Experimental Economics)
- NEP-PBE-2006-05-13 (Public Economics)
- NEP-SOC-2006-05-13 (Social Norms & Social Capital)
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