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- Friends?... Fair enough

In: Proceedings of FIKUSZ 2010

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  • Attila Gulyás

    ()
    (Corvinus University)

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    Abstract

    Social network analysis is one of the fields in the social sciences which went through a huge development in the last two decades. With the availability of newer tools and methods, in-depth analysis of huge networks became possible resulting in important results at various fields. Despite this advancement, the strength of a tie – a foundation of this theory – is still a hot topic in SNA. This paper aims to provide another approach to tie strength, which is based on one of the internal properties of agents manifesting in human interactions – fairness. An analytical model of tie strength is introduced focusing on fairness concerns of people towards each other. The model is analyzed and an experimental method is shown to test the model. Also pilot results are introduced.

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    File URL: http://uni-obuda.hu/users/vecseya/RePEc/pkk/sfyr10/gulyas.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

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    This chapter was published in: László Áron Kóczy (ed.) Proceedings of FIKUSZ 2010, , pages 72-92, 2010.

    This item is provided by Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management in its series Proceedings of FIKUSZ '10 with number 79-92.

    Handle: RePEc:pkk:sfyr10:79-92

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    Related research

    Keywords: fairness; social network analysis; tie strength;

    References

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    1. Forsythe Robert & Horowitz Joel L. & Savin N. E. & Sefton Martin, 1994. "Fairness in Simple Bargaining Experiments," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 6(3), pages 347-369, May.
    2. Bolton Gary E. & Zwick Rami, 1995. "Anonymity versus Punishment in Ultimatum Bargaining," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 10(1), pages 95-121, July.
    3. Björn Vollan, 2008. "Kinship and friendship in a trust game with third party punishment," MAGKS Papers on Economics 200809, Philipps-Universität Marburg, Faculty of Business Administration and Economics, Department of Economics (Volkswirtschaftliche Abteilung).
    4. Guth, Werner & Schmittberger, Rolf & Schwarze, Bernd, 1982. "An experimental analysis of ultimatum bargaining," Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, Elsevier, vol. 3(4), pages 367-388, December.
    5. Engelmann, Dirk & Strobel, Martin, 2000. "An experimental comparison of the fairness models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt," SFB 373 Discussion Papers 2000,28, Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes.
    6. Alvin E. Roth & V. Prasnikar & M. Okuno-Fujiwara & S. Zamir, 1998. "Bargaining and market behavior in Jerusalem, Liubljana, Pittsburgh and Tokyo: an experimental study," Levine's Working Paper Archive 344, David K. Levine.
    7. Haan, Marco & Kooreman, Peter & Riemersma, Tineke, 2006. "Friendship in a Public Good Experiment," IZA Discussion Papers 2108, Institute for the Study of Labor (IZA).
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