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An experimental comparison of the fairness models by Bolton and Ockenfels and by Fehr and Schmidt

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  • Engelmann, Dirk
  • Strobel, Martin

Abstract

In this note we present an experiment to compare the two competing fairness theories by Bolton / Ockenfels and Fehr / Schmidt. For most experiments that these theories have previously been applied to, they make similar predictions so that it is difficult to compare their predictive accuracy. We designed a very simple experiment that induces opposing predictions made by both theories. We find that if the maximization of total payoff is in line with the decision predicted by Fehr and Schmidt, almost all subjects decide accordingly, whereas if it is in line with the prediction by Bolton and Ockenfels, decisions are dispersed. --

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Paper provided by Humboldt University of Berlin, Interdisciplinary Research Project 373: Quantification and Simulation of Economic Processes in its series SFB 373 Discussion Papers with number 2000,28.

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Date of creation: 2000
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Handle: RePEc:zbw:sfb373:200028

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  1. Ernst Fehr & Klaus M. Schmidt, 1999. "A Theory Of Fairness, Competition, And Cooperation," The Quarterly Journal of Economics, MIT Press, MIT Press, vol. 114(3), pages 817-868, August.
  2. Axel Ockenfels & Gary E. Bolton, 2000. "ERC: A Theory of Equity, Reciprocity, and Competition," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, American Economic Association, vol. 90(1), pages 166-193, March.
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Cited by:
  1. David Masclet, 2002. "Peer Pressure in Work Teams : The effects of Inequity Aversion," Post-Print, HAL halshs-00178476, HAL.
  2. Chu, Ke-young, 2004. "Group-Oriented Values, Rules and Cooperation," Working Paper Series, World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER) UNU-WIDER Research Paper , World Institute for Development Economic Research (UNU-WIDER).
  3. Gary E. Bolton & Axel Ockenfels, 2002. "A stress test of fairness measures in models of social utility," Papers on Strategic Interaction, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group 2002-29, Max Planck Institute of Economics, Strategic Interaction Group.
  4. Attila Gulyás, 2010. "- Friends?... Fair enough," Proceedings of FIKUSZ '10, Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management, in: László Áron Kóczy (ed.), Proceedings of FIKUSZ 2010, pages 72-92 Óbuda University, Keleti Faculty of Business and Management.

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