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Anonymity deters collusion in hard-close auctions: experimental evidence

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Author Info

  • Sascha Fullbrunn
  • Tibor Neugebauer

Abstract

This paper studies whether collusion occurs in three-bidder three-object second-price hard-close auctions. The experimental results of two laboratory treatments are reported. The first one, the anonymity treatment, involves subject groups that can trace decisions to the bidder under conditions of anonymity. The second one, the friends treatment, involves groups of subjects who know each other. In this treatment, each bid can be identified with a person. The paper reports no collusion in the anonymity treatment but some collusion in the friends treatment.

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File URL: http://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00779950903005499
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Bibliographic Info

Article provided by Taylor & Francis Journals in its journal New Zealand Economic Papers.

Volume (Year): 43 (2009)
Issue (Month): 2 ()
Pages: 131-148

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Handle: RePEc:taf:nzecpp:v:43:y:2009:i:2:p:131-148

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Web page: http://www.tandfonline.com/RNZP20

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Related research

Keywords: multi-unit auctions; collusion; experimental economics;

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Cited by:
  1. Martin Sefton & Ping Zhang, 2009. "Divisible-good uniform price auctions: the role of allocation rules and communication among bidders," Discussion Papers 2009-21, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.
  2. Ping Zhang, 2009. "Characterization of Pure Strategy Equilibria in Uniform Price IPO Auctions," Discussion Papers 2009-05, The Centre for Decision Research and Experimental Economics, School of Economics, University of Nottingham.

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