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On the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining

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  • Klaus Ritzberger

    (Department of Economics & Finance)

Abstract

In this note we challenge the non-cooperative foundations of cooperative bargaining solutions on the grounds that the limit operation for approaching frictionless world is not robust. We show that when discounting almost ceases to play a role, any individually rational payoff can be supported by some subgame perfect equilibrium. To select the "correct" point imposes excessive informational requirements on the analyst.

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File URL: http://www.ivie.es/downloads/docs/wpasad/wpasad-1992-06.pdf
File Function: Fisrt version / Primera version, 1992
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Bibliographic Info

Paper provided by Instituto Valenciano de Investigaciones Económicas, S.A. (Ivie) in its series Working Papers. Serie AD with number 1992-06.

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Length: 24 pages
Date of creation: Nov 1992
Date of revision:
Publication status: Published by Ivie
Handle: RePEc:ivi:wpasad:1992-06

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  1. Fudenberg, Drew & Maskin, Eric, 1986. "The Folk Theorem in Repeated Games with Discounting or with Incomplete Information," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 54(3), pages 533-54, May.
  2. Muthoo, Abhinay, 1992. "Revocable Commitment and Sequential Bargaining," Economic Journal, Royal Economic Society, vol. 102(411), pages 378-87, March.
  3. Asheim, G.B., 1989. "A Unique Solution To N-Person Sequential Bargaining," Papers 11-89, Norwegian School of Economics and Business Administration-.
  4. Sutton, John, 1986. "Non-cooperative Bargaining Theory: An Introduction," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 53(5), pages 709-24, October.
  5. Guth, W. & Ritzberger, K., 1992. "On Durable Goods Monopolies and the (Anti)Coase-Conjecture," Discussion Paper 1992-15, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
  6. Friedman, James W, 1971. "A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for Supergames," Review of Economic Studies, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 38(113), pages 1-12, January.
  7. Shaked, Avner & Sutton, John, 1984. "Involuntary Unemployment as a Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 52(6), pages 1351-64, November.
  8. Ariel Rubinstein, 2010. "Perfect Equilibrium in a Bargaining Model," Levine's Working Paper Archive 252, David K. Levine.
  9. Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1992. "Another n-person bargaining game with a unique perfect equilibrium," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 38(3), pages 275-277, March.
  10. Arial Rubinstein & Asher Wolinsky, 1985. "Equilibrium in a Market with Sequential Bargaining," Levine's Working Paper Archive 623, David K. Levine.
  11. Martin J. Osborne & Ariel Rubinstein, 2005. "Bargaining and Markets," Levine's Bibliography 666156000000000515, UCLA Department of Economics.
  12. Sjostrom, Tomas, 1991. "Stahl's bargaining model," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 36(2), pages 153-157, June.
  13. Chae, Suchan & Yang, Jeong-Ae, 1988. "The unique perfect equilibrium of an n-person bargaining game," Economics Letters, Elsevier, vol. 28(3), pages 221-223.
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