When Does Regulation Bite? Co-Determination and the Nature of Employment Relations
AbstractThe German Codetermination Law grants workers of establishments with 200 or more employees the right to have a works councillor fully exempted from his regular job while still being paid his regular salary. We analyze theoretically and empirically how this de jure right to paid leave of absence translates into practice and explicitly take into account the nature of the industrial relations participation regime. We find the right of exemption to make no difference in cooperative employment relations, but to develop its bite in adversarial rela-tions, i.e. when – without legal enforcement – the legislator’s intent would not be realized.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by University of Zurich, Institute for Strategy and Business Economics (ISU) in its series Working Papers with number 0147.
Length: 22 pages
Date of creation: Jul 2011
Date of revision:
Works councils; employment relations; de facto and de jure consequences of legal regulations;
Find related papers by JEL classification:
- J53 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - Labor-Management Relations; Industrial Jurisprudence
- M54 - Business Administration and Business Economics; Marketing; Accounting - - Personnel Economics - - - Labor Management
- K31 - Law and Economics - - Other Substantive Areas of Law - - - Labor Law
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2011-08-09 (All new papers)
- NEP-HME-2011-08-09 (Heterodox Microeconomics)
- NEP-HRM-2011-08-09 (Human Capital & Human Resource Management)
- NEP-LAB-2011-08-09 (Labour Economics)
- NEP-REG-2011-08-09 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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Research Papers in Economics
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