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Partial Harmonization of Corporate Taxes in an Asymmetric Repeated Game Setting

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  • Itaya, Jun-ichi
  • Okamura, Makoto
  • Yamaguchi, Chikara
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    Abstract

    This paper investigates the conditions under which partial harmonization for capital taxation is sustained in a repeated interactions model of tax competition when there are three heterogenous countries with respect to their capital endowments. We show that regardless of the structure of the coalition (i.e., any group of countries), whether partial tax harmonization is sustainable or not crucially depends on the capital endowment of the median country relative to those of the large and small countries. The most noteworthy finding is that the closer the capital endowment of the median country to the average capital endowment of the large and small countries, the less likely is the tax harmonization including the median country to prevail and the more likely is the partial tax harmonization excluding the median country to prevail.

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    File URL: http://hdl.handle.net/2115/44188
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    File URL: http://eprints.lib.hokudai.ac.jp/dspace/bitstream/2115/44188/1/DPA229.pdf
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    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Graduate School of Economics and Business Administration, Hokkaido University in its series Discussion paper series. A with number 229.

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    Length: 35 pages
    Date of creation: Nov 2010
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hok:dpaper:229

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    Related research

    Keywords: Tax coordination; Asymmetric countries; Repeated game; Tax competition; H73; F59; F21;

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