Man-Keung Tang (International Monetary Fund) Shang-Jin Wei (Columbia University, NBER)
Abstract
This paper studies the value of external commitment to policy reforms in the case of WTO/GATT accessions. The accessions often entail reforms that go beyond narrowly defined trade liberalization, and have to overcome fierce resistance in the acceding countries, as reflected in protracted negotiations. We study the growth and investment consequences of WTO/GATT accessions, with attention to a possible selection bias. We find that the accessions tend to raise income, but only for those countries that were subject to rigorous accession procedures. Policy commitments associated with the accessions were helpful, especially for countries with poor governance.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by Hong Kong Institute for Monetary Research in its series Working Papers with number
152009.
Length: 36 pages Date of creation: Apr 2009 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hkm:wpaper:152009
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References listed on IDEAS Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
Kyle Bagwell & Robert W. Staiger, 1999.
"An Economic Theory of GATT,"
American Economic Review,
American Economic Association, vol. 89(1), pages 215-248, March.
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