Advanced Search
MyIDEAS: Login

Cost Sharing in Chains and Other Fixed Trees

Contents:

Author Info

  • Hougaard, Jens Leth

    ()
    (Department of Food and Resource Economics)

  • Tvede, Mich

    ()
    (Newcastle University)

  • Østerdal, Lars Peter

    ()
    (Department of Business and Economics)

Registered author(s):

    Abstract

    We consider a cost sharing problem among agents on a line. The problem is closely related to the classic airport game, but in our model agents are characterized by their location, rather than their needed runway length. We characterize a family of cost allocation rules in which agents pay a share of the incremental costs as well as any debt from upstream agents, with the Bird rule (where agents pay their full incremental cost) and the ‘free rider’ rule (where the terminal agent pays everything) as the two extreme cases. We also extend the analysis to cost sharing among agents located on a fixed tree structure.

    Download Info

    If you experience problems downloading a file, check if you have the proper application to view it first. In case of further problems read the IDEAS help page. Note that these files are not on the IDEAS site. Please be patient as the files may be large.
    File URL: http://static.sdu.dk/mediafiles//6/E/2/%7B6E200E61-2E2D-4F0E-B69D-9256A00E948C%7Ddpbe12_2013.pdf
    Download Restriction: no

    Bibliographic Info

    Paper provided by Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark in its series Discussion Papers of Business and Economics with number 12/2013.

    as in new window
    Length: 15 pages
    Date of creation: 05 Sep 2013
    Date of revision:
    Handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2013_012

    Contact details of provider:
    Postal: Department of Business and Economics, University of Southern Denmark, Campusvej 55, DK-5230 Odense M, Denmark
    Phone: 65 50 32 33
    Fax: 65 50 32 37
    Email:
    Web page: http://www.sdu.dk/ivoe
    More information through EDIRC

    Related research

    Keywords: Airport game; cost allocation; axiomatic characterization; Bird Rule; Incremental cost sharing;

    Find related papers by JEL classification:

    This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:

    References

    References listed on IDEAS
    Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
    as in new window
    1. William Thomson, 2007. "Cost allocation and airport problems," RCER Working Papers 537, University of Rochester - Center for Economic Research (RCER).
    2. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    3. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
    4. Potters, Jos & Sudholter, Peter, 1999. "Airport problems and consistent allocation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 83-102, July.
    5. Rodica Brânzei & Elena Iñarra & Stef Tijs & José Zarzuelo, 2006. "A Simple Algorithm for the Nucleolus of Airport Profit Games," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 34(2), pages 259-272, August.
    6. Moulin, Herve & Shenker, Scott, 1992. "Serial Cost Sharing," Econometrica, Econometric Society, vol. 60(5), pages 1009-37, September.
    7. Aadland, David & Kolpin, Van, 1998. "Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 203-218, March.
    8. Pradeep Dubey, 1982. "The Shapley Value as Aircraft Landing Fees--Revisited," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 28(8), pages 869-874, August.
    9. Granot, D, et al, 1996. "The Kernel/Nucleolus of a Standard Tree Game," International Journal of Game Theory, Springer, vol. 25(2), pages 219-44.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Lists

    This item is not listed on Wikipedia, on a reading list or among the top items on IDEAS.

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:hhs:sdueko:2013_012. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: (Lene Holbæk).

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If references are entirely missing, you can add them using this form.

    If the full references list an item that is present in RePEc, but the system did not link to it, you can help with this form.

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.