IDEAS home Printed from https://ideas.repec.org/a/bla/jpbect/v7y2005i4p623-640.html
   My bibliography  Save this article

Cooperation by Asymmetric Agents in a Joint Project

Author

Listed:
  • R. BRÂNZEI
  • E. IÑARRA
  • S. TIJS
  • J. M. ZARZUELO

Abstract

The object of study is cooperation in joint projects where agents may have different desired sophistication levels for the project and where some of the agents may have low budgets. In this context, questions concerning the optimal realizable sophistication level and the distribution of the related costs among the participants are tackled. A related cooperative game, the enterprise game, and a non‐cooperative game, the contribution game, are both helpful. It turns out that there is an interesting relation between the core of the convex enterprise game and the set of strong Nash equilibria of the contribution game. Special attention is paid to a new rule inspired by the Baker–Thompson rule in the airport landing fee literature. For this rule, the project is split up in a sequence of subprojects where the involved participants pay amounts which are, roughly speaking, equal, but not more than their budgets allow. The resulting payoff distribution turns out to be a core element of the related enterprise game.

Suggested Citation

  • R. Brânzei & E. Iñarra & S. Tijs & J. M. Zarzuelo, 2005. "Cooperation by Asymmetric Agents in a Joint Project," Journal of Public Economic Theory, Association for Public Economic Theory, vol. 7(4), pages 623-640, October.
    • Handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:7:y:2005:i:4:p:623-640
    DOI: 10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00237.x
    as

    Download full text from publisher

    File URL: https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00237.x
    Download Restriction: no
    File URL: https://libkey.io/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2005.00237.x?utm_source=ideas
    LibKey link: if access is restricted and if your library uses this service, LibKey will redirect you to where you can use your library subscription to access this item
    ---><---

    Other versions of this item:

    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Potters, Jos & Sudholter, Peter, 1999. "Airport problems and consistent allocation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 83-102, July.
    2. SCHMEIDLER, David, 1969. "The nucleolus of a characteristic function game," LIDAM Reprints CORE 44, Université catholique de Louvain, Center for Operations Research and Econometrics (CORE).
    3. Aadland, David & Kolpin, Van, 1998. "Shared irrigation costs: An empirical and axiomatic analysis," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 35(2), pages 203-218, March.
    4. Driessen, T.S.H. & Tijs, S.H., 1985. "The t-value, the core and semiconvex games," Other publications TiSEM 016b6b5d-a476-44ca-bd05-7, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    5. S.C. Littlechild & G.F. Thompson, 1977. "Aircraft Landing Fees: A Game Theory Approach," Bell Journal of Economics, The RAND Corporation, vol. 8(1), pages 186-204, Spring.
    6. Peyton Young, H., 1998. "Cost allocation, demand revelation, and core implementation," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 36(3), pages 213-228, December.
    7. S. C. Littlechild & G. Owen, 1973. "A Simple Expression for the Shapley Value in a Special Case," Management Science, INFORMS, vol. 20(3), pages 370-372, November.
    8. S. C. Littlechild, 1975. "Common Costs, Fixed Charges, Clubs and Games," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 42(1), pages 117-124.
    9. Hervé Moulin, 1994. "Serial Cost-Sharing of Excludable Public Goods," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 61(2), pages 305-325.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

    Citations

    Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
    as


    Cited by:

    1. Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers & Ruud Hendrickx, 2001. "Operations research games: A survey," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 9(2), pages 139-199, December.
    2. Brânzei, R. & Inarra, E. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J., 2003. "An Algorithm for the Nucleolus of Airport Profit Problems," Discussion Paper 2003-50, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    3. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2004. "Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake," Other publications TiSEM f9573808-10b5-4a9e-a835-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    4. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2004. "Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake," Discussion Paper 2004-108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.
    5. Ryusuke Shinohara, 2014. "Participation and demand levels for a joint project," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 43(4), pages 925-952, December.

    Most related items

    These are the items that most often cite the same works as this one and are cited by the same works as this one.
    1. M. Fiestras-Janeiro & Ignacio García-Jurado & Manuel Mosquera, 2011. "Cooperative games and cost allocation problems," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 19(1), pages 1-22, July.
    2. Peter Borm & Herbert Hamers & Ruud Hendrickx, 2001. "Operations research games: A survey," TOP: An Official Journal of the Spanish Society of Statistics and Operations Research, Springer;Sociedad de Estadística e Investigación Operativa, vol. 9(2), pages 139-199, December.
    3. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2013. "Cost Sharing in Chains and Other Fixed Trees," Discussion Papers on Economics 12/2013, University of Southern Denmark, Department of Economics.
    4. M. Albizuri & J. Echarri & J. Zarzuelo, 2015. "A non-cooperative mechanism for the Shapley value of airport problems," Annals of Operations Research, Springer, vol. 235(1), pages 1-11, December.
    5. Paula Jaramillo, 2013. "Congestion in irrigation problems," Documentos CEDE 10553, Universidad de los Andes, Facultad de Economía, CEDE.
    6. Yokote, Koji & Funaki, Yukihiko & Kamijo, Yoshio, 2017. "Coincidence of the Shapley value with other solutions satisfying covariance," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 89(C), pages 1-9.
    7. Jens Leth Hougaard & Mich Tvede, 2011. "Incremental Cost Sharing in Chains and Fixed Trees," MSAP Working Paper Series 02_2011, University of Copenhagen, Department of Food and Resource Economics.
    8. Hougaard, Jens Leth & Moreno-Ternero, Juan D. & Tvede, Mich & Østerdal, Lars Peter, 2017. "Sharing the proceeds from a hierarchical venture," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 102(C), pages 98-110.
    9. Dehez, Pierre, 2023. "Sharing a collective probability of success," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 123(C), pages 122-127.
    10. Takayuki Oishi, 2019. "A General Derivation of Axiomatizations for Allocation Rules: Duality and Anti-Duality Approach," Keio-IES Discussion Paper Series 2019-011, Institute for Economics Studies, Keio University.
    11. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2004. "Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake," Other publications TiSEM f9573808-10b5-4a9e-a835-2, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    12. Brânzei, R. & Inarra, E. & Tijs, S.H. & Zarzuelo, J., 2003. "An Algorithm for the Nucleolus of Airport Profit Problems," Other publications TiSEM 51710630-9fcc-49ea-ba26-b, Tilburg University, School of Economics and Management.
    13. Miguel Ángel Mirás Calvo & Carmen Quinteiro Sandomingo & Estela Sánchez Rodríguez, 2016. "Monotonicity implications for the ranking of rules for airport problems," International Journal of Economic Theory, The International Society for Economic Theory, vol. 12(4), pages 379-400, December.
    14. Arin Aguirre, Francisco Javier & Iñarra García, María Elena & Luquin, Paloma, 2006. "A noncooperative view on two consistent aiport cost sharing rules," IKERLANAK 6372, Universidad del País Vasco - Departamento de Fundamentos del Análisis Económico I.
    15. Baomin Dong & Debing Ni & Yuntong Wang, 2012. "Sharing a Polluted River Network," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 53(3), pages 367-387, November.
    16. Sudhölter, Peter & Zarzuelo, José M., 2017. "Characterizations of highway toll pricing methods," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 260(1), pages 161-170.
    17. Potters, Jos & Sudholter, Peter, 1999. "Airport problems and consistent allocation rules," Mathematical Social Sciences, Elsevier, vol. 38(1), pages 83-102, July.
    18. Hu, Cheng-Cheng & Tsay, Min-Hung & Yeh, Chun-Hsien, 2018. "A study of the nucleolus in the nested cost-sharing problem: Axiomatic and strategic perspectives," Games and Economic Behavior, Elsevier, vol. 109(C), pages 82-98.
    19. M. J. Albizuri & J. M. Echarri & J. M. Zarzuelo, 2018. "A Non-cooperative Mechanism Yielding the Nucleolus of Airport Problems," Group Decision and Negotiation, Springer, vol. 27(1), pages 153-163, February.
    20. Tijs, S.H. & Brânzei, R., 2004. "Cases in Cooperation and Cutting the Cake," Discussion Paper 2004-108, Tilburg University, Center for Economic Research.

    More about this item

    Statistics

    Access and download statistics

    Corrections

    All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:jpbect:v:7:y:2005:i:4:p:623-640. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.

    If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.

    If CitEc recognized a bibliographic reference but did not link an item in RePEc to it, you can help with this form .

    If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.

    For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: https://edirc.repec.org/data/apettea.html .

    Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.

    IDEAS is a RePEc service. RePEc uses bibliographic data supplied by the respective publishers.