Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries
AbstractFor sufficiently low abatement costs many countries might undertake significant emission reductions even without any international agreement on emission reductions. We consider a situation where a coalition of countries does not cooperate on emission reductions but cooperates on the development of new, climate friendly technologies that reduce the costs of abatement. The equilibrium size of such a coalition, as well as equilibrium emissions, depends on the distribution across countries of their willingness to pay for emission reductions. Increased willingness to pay for emissions reductions for any group of countries will reduce (or leave unchanged) the equilibrium coalition size. However, the effect of such an increase in aggregate willingness to pay on equilibrium emissions is ambiguous.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 02/2013.
Length: 35 pages
Date of creation: 07 Jan 2013
Date of revision:
Contact details of provider:
Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
Technology agreement; Coalition stab ility; climate; International agreement;
Other versions of this item:
- Michael Hoel & Aart de Zeeuw, 2013. "Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries," Working Papers 2013.07, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- C72 - Mathematical and Quantitative Methods - - Game Theory and Bargaining Theory - - - Noncooperative Games
- F42 - International Economics - - Macroeconomic Aspects of International Trade and Finance - - - International Policy Coordination and Transmission
- O32 - Economic Development, Technological Change, and Growth - - Technological Change; Research and Development; Intellectual Property Rights - - - Management of Technological Innovation and R&D
- Q02 - Agricultural and Natural Resource Economics; Environmental and Ecological Economics - - General - - - Global Commodity Market
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-05-05 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENE-2013-05-05 (Energy Economics)
- NEP-ENV-2013-05-05 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-GTH-2013-05-05 (Game Theory)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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