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Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric International Environmental Negotiations

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  • De Zeeuw, A.
  • Ochea, M.

    (University of Amsterdam)

Abstract

We study the evolutionary success of a generalised trigger strategy within an asymmetric, n-player Prisoner's Dilemma environment, with application to the evolution of cooperation in international environmental negotiations. Our results suggest that there exist regions in the relevant parameter space - i.e. costs and benefits, low and high tit-for-tat thresholds, probability of continued interaction - such that (partial) cooperation may emerge as long-run attractor of the evolutionary dynamics in these asymmetric social dilemmas.

Suggested Citation

  • De Zeeuw, A. & Ochea, M., 2013. "Evolution of Reciprocity in Asymmetric International Environmental Negotiations," CeNDEF Working Papers 13-09, Universiteit van Amsterdam, Center for Nonlinear Dynamics in Economics and Finance.
    • Handle: RePEc:ams:ndfwpp:13-09
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Jörg Rieskamp & Peter Todd, 2006. "The Evolution of Cooperative Strategies for Asymmetric Social Interactions," Theory and Decision, Springer, vol. 60(1), pages 69-111, February.
    2. Barrett, Scott, 1994. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 46(0), pages 878-894, Supplemen.
    3. Pavlova, Yulia & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2013. "Asymmetries in international environmental agreements," Environment and Development Economics, Cambridge University Press, vol. 18(1), pages 51-68, February.
    4. Matthew McGinty, 2007. "International environmental agreements among asymmetric nations," Oxford Economic Papers, Oxford University Press, vol. 59(1), pages 45-62, January.
    5. Michèle Breton & Lucia Sbragia & Georges Zaccour, 2010. "A Dynamic Model for International Environmental Agreements," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(1), pages 25-48, January.
    6. Hoel, Michael & de Zeeuw, Aart, 2013. "Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries," Memorandum 02/2013, Oslo University, Department of Economics.
    7. Fuentes-Albero, Cristina & Rubio, Santiago J., 2010. "Can international environmental cooperation be bought?," European Journal of Operational Research, Elsevier, vol. 202(1), pages 255-264, April.
    8. Hoel, Michael & De Zeeuw, Aart, 2013. "Technology Agreements with Heterogeneous Countries," Climate Change and Sustainable Development 146352, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
    9. Matthew McGinty, 2010. "International Environmental Agreements as Evolutionary Games," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 45(2), pages 251-269, February.
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