The Climate Policy Hold‐Up: Green Technologies, Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements
Author
Abstract
Suggested Citation
DOI: 10.1111/sjoe.12179
Download full text from publisher
Other versions of this item:
- Goeschl, Timo & Perino, Grischa, 2015. "The Climate Policy Hold-Up: Green Technologies,Intellectual Property Rights, and the Abatement Incentives of International Agreements," Working Papers 0591, University of Heidelberg, Department of Economics.
Citations
Citations are extracted by the CitEc Project, subscribe to its RSS feed for this item.
Cited by:
- Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2022.
"An adaptation-mitigation game: does adaptation promote participation in international environmental agreements?,"
International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 22(3), pages 439-479, September.
- Borrero, Miguel Borrero & Rubio, Santiago J., 2021. "An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Participation in International Environmental Agreements?," FEEM Working Papers 311055, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Miguel Borrero & Santiago J. Rubio, 2021. "An Adaptation-Mitigation Game: Does Adaptation Promote Participation in International Environmental Agreements?," Working Papers 2021.16, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Haiyang Xia & Tijun Fan & Xiangyun Chang, 2019. "Emission Reduction Technology Licensing and Diffusion Under Command-and-Control Regulation," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 72(2), pages 477-500, February.
- Santiago J. Rubio, 2018.
"Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity,"
Working Papers
2018.29, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei.
- Rubio, Santiago J., 2018. "Self-Enforcing International Environmental Agreements: Adaptation and Complementarity," ETA: Economic Theory and Applications 276179, Fondazione Eni Enrico Mattei (FEEM).
- Aldona Małgorzata Dereń & Jan Skonieczny, 2022. "Green Intellectual Property as a Strategic Resource in the Sustainable Development of an Organization," Sustainability, MDPI, vol. 14(8), pages 1-11, April.
- McEvoy, David M. & McGinty, Matthew, 2018. "Negotiating a uniform emissions tax in international environmental agreements," Journal of Environmental Economics and Management, Elsevier, vol. 90(C), pages 217-231.
- Tiziano Distefano & Simone D’Alessandro, 2021. "A new two-nested-game approach: linking micro- and macro-scales in international environmental agreements," International Environmental Agreements: Politics, Law and Economics, Springer, vol. 21(3), pages 493-516, September.
- Thomas Eichner & Gilbert Kollenbach & Mark Schopf, 2021.
"Buying versus Leasing Fuel Deposits for Preservation,"
Scandinavian Journal of Economics, Wiley Blackwell, vol. 123(1), pages 110-143, January.
- Thomas Eichner & Gilbert Kollenbach & Mark Schopf, 2018. "Buying versus leasing fuel deposits for preservation," Volkswirtschaftliche Diskussionsbeiträge 186-18, Universität Siegen, Fakultät Wirtschaftswissenschaften, Wirtschaftsinformatik und Wirtschaftsrecht.
- Eichner, Thomas & Kollenbach, Gilbert & Schopf, Mark, 2018. "Buying versus leasing fuel deposits for preservation," VfS Annual Conference 2018 (Freiburg, Breisgau): Digital Economy 181597, Verein für Socialpolitik / German Economic Association.
- Hans Gersbach & Quirin Oberpriller & Martin Scheffel, 2019. "Double Free-Riding in Innovation and Abatement: A Rules Treaty Solution," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 73(2), pages 449-483, June.
- Fuhai Hong & Larry Karp & Tat-How Teh, 2021. "Identity in public goods contribution," Social Choice and Welfare, Springer;The Society for Social Choice and Welfare, vol. 57(3), pages 617-664, October.
- Ryusuke Shinohara, 2021. "Voluntary Participation in International Environmental Agreements and Authority Structures in a Federation: A Note," Environmental & Resource Economics, Springer;European Association of Environmental and Resource Economists, vol. 79(1), pages 25-32, May.
Corrections
All material on this site has been provided by the respective publishers and authors. You can help correct errors and omissions. When requesting a correction, please mention this item's handle: RePEc:bla:scandj:v:119:y:2017:i:3:p:709-732. See general information about how to correct material in RePEc.
If you have authored this item and are not yet registered with RePEc, we encourage you to do it here. This allows to link your profile to this item. It also allows you to accept potential citations to this item that we are uncertain about.
We have no bibliographic references for this item. You can help adding them by using this form .
If you know of missing items citing this one, you can help us creating those links by adding the relevant references in the same way as above, for each refering item. If you are a registered author of this item, you may also want to check the "citations" tab in your RePEc Author Service profile, as there may be some citations waiting for confirmation.
For technical questions regarding this item, or to correct its authors, title, abstract, bibliographic or download information, contact: Wiley Content Delivery (email available below). General contact details of provider: http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9442 .
Please note that corrections may take a couple of weeks to filter through the various RePEc services.