Strategic Use of Environmental Information
AbstractStrategic use of environmental information may have as consequence that a benevolent environmental agency will choose not to disclose information leading to reduced moral motivation. Thus, decision makers will not have access to such information, implying that they will not be able to adjust their decisions to available information on the state of the environment. In contrast, if the benevolent environmental agency instead bases its regulation on standard economic instruments, these instruments will incorporate all available information. Keywords and Phrases: Environmental regulation, voluntary contributions, moral motivation, hard information.
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Bibliographic InfoPaper provided by Oslo University, Department of Economics in its series Memorandum with number 21/2009.
Length: 19 pages
Date of creation: 10 Sep 2009
Date of revision:
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Postal: Department of Economics, University of Oslo, P.O Box 1095 Blindern, N-0317 Oslo, Norway
Phone: 22 85 51 27
Fax: 22 85 50 35
Web page: http://www.oekonomi.uio.no/indexe.html
More information through EDIRC
environmental regulation; voluntary contributions; moral motivation; hard iformation;
Other versions of this item:
- D11 - Microeconomics - - Household Behavior - - - Consumer Economics: Theory
- H41 - Public Economics - - Publicly Provided Goods - - - Public Goods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-AGR-2010-02-13 (Agricultural Economics)
- NEP-ALL-2010-02-13 (All new papers)
- NEP-ENV-2010-02-13 (Environmental Economics)
- NEP-REG-2010-02-13 (Regulation)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
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