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Is Unemployment Always Higher When Insiders Decide?

Author

Listed:
  • Filges, Trine

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

  • Larsen, Birthe

    (Department of Economics, Copenhagen Business School)

Abstract

This paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment.

Suggested Citation

  • Filges, Trine & Larsen, Birthe, 2000. "Is Unemployment Always Higher When Insiders Decide?," Working Papers 13-2000, Copenhagen Business School, Department of Economics.
    • Handle: RePEc:hhs:cbsnow:2000_013
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    References listed on IDEAS

    as
    1. Farber, Henry S, 1978. "Individual Preferences and Union Wage Determination: The Case of the United Mine Workers," Journal of Political Economy, University of Chicago Press, vol. 86(5), pages 923-942, October.
    2. Oliver Jean Blanchard & Peter Diamond, 1989. "The Beveridge Curve," Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, Economic Studies Program, The Brookings Institution, vol. 20(1), pages 1-76.
    3. Arthur J. Hosios, 1990. "On The Efficiency of Matching and Related Models of Search and Unemployment," The Review of Economic Studies, Review of Economic Studies Ltd, vol. 57(2), pages 279-298.
    4. Kiander, Jaakko, 1993. "Endogenous unemployment insurance in a monopoly union model when job search matters," Journal of Public Economics, Elsevier, vol. 52(1), pages 101-115, August.
    5. Lindbeck, Assar & Snower, Dennis J, 1986. "Wage Setting, Unemployment, and Insider-Outsider Relations," American Economic Review, American Economic Association, vol. 76(2), pages 235-239, May.
    Full references (including those not matched with items on IDEAS)

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    More about this item

    Keywords

    Insiders and Outsiders; Search; Unemployment;
    All these keywords.

    JEL classification:

    • J20 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Demand and Supply of Labor - - - General
    • J50 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Labor-Management Relations, Trade Unions, and Collective Bargaining - - - General
    • J60 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, Vacancies, and Immigrant Workers - - - General

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