Filges, Trine () (Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Aarhus School of Business) Larsen, Birthe () (Centre for Labour Market and Social Research, Aarhus School of Business)
Abstract
This paper challenges the traditional view that unemployment is high because insiders determine the union wage. The insiders in this paper are characterized by being more efficient when they search for a job than the outsiders, implying that they experience relatively less unemployment. We assume that wages are determined by a monopoly union and further that a union leader is elected by a majority voting rule. Insiders may prefer a lower wage than outsiders, implying the possibility of lower unemployment when insiders are decisive in the union than if outsiders were decisive in the union.
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Publisher Info
Paper provided by University of Aarhus, Aarhus School of Business, Centre for Labour Market and Social Research in its series CLS Working Papers with number
00-2.
Length: 20 pages Date of creation: 01 Mar 2000 Date of revision: Handle: RePEc:hhs:aarcls:2000_002
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Find related papers by JEL classification: J64 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Mobility, Unemployment, and Vacancies - - - Unemployment: Models, Duration, Incidence, and Job Search
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