Physicians' balance billing, supplemental insurance and access to health care
AbstractSome countries allow physicians to balance bill patients, that is, to bill a fee above the one that is negotiated with, and reimbursed by the health authorities. Balance billing is known for restricting access to physicians' services while supplemental insurance against balance billing amounts is supposed to alleviate the access problem. This paper analyzes in a theoretical setting the consequences of balance billing on the fees setting and on the inequality of access among the users of physicians' services. It also shows that supplemental insurance against the expenses associated with balance billing, rather than alleviating the access problem, increases it.
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Date of creation: 12 Feb 2013
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Physicians' fees; balance billing; supplemental insurance;
Other versions of this item:
- Izabela Jelovac, 2013. "Physicians’ balance billing, supplemental insurance and access to health care," Working Papers, Groupe d'Analyse et de ThÃ©orie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), UniversitÃ© Lyon 2, Ecole Normale SupÃ©rieure 1305, Groupe d'Analyse et de Théorie Economique (GATE), Centre national de la recherche scientifique (CNRS), Université Lyon 2, Ecole Normale Supérieure.
- I13 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health Insurance, Public and Private
- I14 - Health, Education, and Welfare - - Health - - - Health and Inequality
- J33 - Labor and Demographic Economics - - Wages, Compensation, and Labor Costs - - - Compensation Packages; Payment Methods
This paper has been announced in the following NEP Reports:
- NEP-ALL-2013-03-16 (All new papers)
- NEP-HEA-2013-03-16 (Health Economics)
- NEP-IAS-2013-03-16 (Insurance Economics)
Please report citation or reference errors to , or , if you are the registered author of the cited work, log in to your RePEc Author Service profile, click on "citations" and make appropriate adjustments.:
- Thomas C. Buchmueller & Agnès Couffinhal & Michel Grignon & Marc Perronnin, 2004.
"Access to physician services: does supplemental insurance matter? Evidence from France,"
John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., vol. 13(7), pages 669-687.
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- Thomas C. Buchmueller & Agnes Couffinhal, 2004. "Private Health Insurance in France," OECD Health Working Papers 12, OECD Publishing.
- Yaari, Menahem E, 1987. "The Dual Theory of Choice under Risk," Econometrica, Econometric Society, Econometric Society, vol. 55(1), pages 95-115, January.
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